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INTRODUCTION
The Washington State constitution, adopted in 1889, has never been
comprehensively revised.' Written during the height of the populist
'For many years civic, political, legislative, and professional organizations have
been producing detailed proposals for a complete revision of the Washington State
constitution. Some of the more recent studies have been: WASmEOGTOx (STATE),
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Washington Law Review Vol. 45: 535, 1970
movement, it is long, detailed, and intentionally shackles state gov-
ernment. Among other restrictions, the legislature is limited to a single,
short, biennial session and the power of the executive is scattered
among many independently elected executive officers and dozens of
near-autonomous boards and commissions.
The state constitution may be revised by amendment and, between
1889 and 1969, the legislature proposed and the electorate approved
fifty-four single-subject constitutional amendments.' These amend-
ments were only a few of the hundreds considered. The constitution
of 1889 also provides that the legislature may propose a constitutional
convention to revise or amend the constitution.3 However, the legis-
lature, for various political reasons, has consistently refused to submit
the convention issue to the electorate. Bills to convene a constitutional
convention have been introduced in nearly every session for the past
thirty years but the legislature has only voted on the issue once. In
1965, the House of Representatives approved a convention proposal
by the requisite two-thirds vote. That bill was allowed to die in the
Senate. Legislative proposals for a "gateway amendment"--a device
that would enable the legislature to initiate broad constitutional revi-
CONSTITUTIONAL ADVISORY CouNciL, REPORT (1966); WASHINGTON STATE DIVISION,
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN, A CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF
WASHINGTON (1967); University of Washington School of Law, Papers of The State
Constitutional Revision Conference, June 13-14, 1968 (unpublished product of na-
tional conference with substantial focus on the Washington experience-available from
Professor of Law Ralph W. Johnson); Reports and Working Papers of the Washington
State Constitutional Revision Committee, 1968-69 (unpublished material available
from Commission Executive Director, George A. Condon, Washington State Uni-
versity); University of Washington School of Law, Legislation Seminar, Papers on
Washington State Constitutional Revision, 1969 (unpublished papers in the University
of Washington Law School Library).
For some of the past reports see REPORT OF THE ADVISORY CONSTITUTION REVISION
COMMarISSION OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON (1935); and, E. CAMPBELL, THE BACK-
GROUND OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON (1949).
'See WASH. REV. CODE Vol. O for the texts and dates of passage of the fifty-four
amendments to the Washington constitution. VASH. CONST. art. XXIII, § 1, as presently
interpreted by the Washington Supreme Court, restricts constitutional amendments to
a single subject. Gottstein V. Lister, 88 Wash. 462, 153 Pac. 595 (1915). This interpre-
tation prevents substantial constitutional revision through the amendment process.
'WASH. CONST. art. XXIII, § 2 which reads:
Whenever two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the legislature
shall deem it necessary to call a convention to revise or amend this Constitution,
they shall recommend to the electors to vote at the next general election, for or
against a convention, and if a majority of all the electors voting at said election
shall have voted for a convention, the legislature shall at the next session, provide
by law for calling the same; and such convention shall consist of a number
of members, not less than that of the most numerous branch of the legislature.
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sions through the amendment procedure-have been similarly un-
successful. 4
Because of this legislative recalcitrance,' Washington advocates of
general constitutional revision turned, in 1968, to the initiative peti-
tion in an attempt to place the convention issue before the people.'
While this initiative movement failed, the possible success of a similar
future effort presents a complex legal issue which has never been
squarely faced by any court.' As noted, the constitution of 1889
'A "gateway amendment" was passed by the Washington House of Representatives
on February 19, 1969. It languished in the Senate Constitution Committee for nearly
three months since Committee Chairman John McCutcheon, the Senate's oldest
member, felt constitutional amendment was unnecessary. On May 9, an attempt was
made to discharge the bill from the Committee. On the first vote the discharge motion
passed 22 to 19. However, Senator R. R. Greive, the Democratic majority leader, de-
manded a call of the Senate to regroup conservative forces. On the second roll call
the discharge motion was defeated 21 to 23. Four "establishment" Democrats made
the difference. Senators Martin Durkan, Al Henry, Robert ]Bailey and Gordon Sandison
effectively killed the "gateway amendment" for the 1969 session. Seattle Post-Intel-
ligencer, May 10, 1969, at 3, col. 2.
'As one observer has suggested: "The Initiative has been looked upon as an expe-
dient of last resort, to be used in those instances in which the legislature could not be
prevailed upon to move." Crouch, The Constitutional Initiative in Operation, 33 Am.
Por.. Sci. REv. 634, 637 (1939).
Others advise that an initiative is not necessary:
If the legislature, possessing these powers of government [to propose a convention],
be unwilling to pass a law to take the sense of the people, or to delegate to a
convention all the powers the people desire to confer upon their delegates, the
remedy is still in their own hands; they can elect new representatives at will.
Wells v. Bain, 75 Pa. 39, 47 (1874).
Hoar disagrees:
[TIhe legislature may stand in the way of fulfillment of the popular will, just
as the legislatures have in some cases nullified constitutional provisions by refusing
to pass an enabling act thereon. The remedy of electing new representatives, as
suggested by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, is not sufficient.
R. HOAR, CoNSTIoTioNAL CoNvENTioNs: THEm NATuRE, PowERs, AND LsnIATIoNs
76 (1917).
'The full text of Initiative 241 is reproduced in the Appendix. The sponsor of the
initiative was the Committee to Call a Constitutional Convention comprised of: Wes
Rainey, Jr., President, Washington State Jaycees; Mrs. Ivar Spector, Past-President,
Washington Division of the American Association of University Women; S. Lynn
Sutcliffe, President, Young Washington, Inc.; and Mrs. Mortimer H. Thomas, President,
League of Women Voters of Washington.
Initiative 241 was not placed on the November, 1968, general election ballot since
supporters of the initiative, delayed by litigation, succeeded in gathering ony 60,000
of the 102,000 signatures required by the Constitution.
'The unique legal issue is whether a constitutional convention can be convened by
initiative. The Washington State Supreme Court refused to consider this issue in the
1968 litigation that surrounded Initiative 241. That litigation arose when the Secretary
of State refused to file and number the proposed Initiative, arguing that a convention
could not constitutionally be convened by initiative. The Supreme Court issued a writ
of mandamus to compel the Secretary of State to perform his "ministerial" duty of
filing and numbering the Initiative. Though both parties argued that the Court should
decide the broad constitutional issue, the court felt that it was being asked for an
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authorizes the legislature to propose a constitutional convention; but
the legislative initiative provision, inserted into article II of the con-
stitution in 1912 by the seventh amendment, does not expressly autho-
rize placing a convention enabling act on the ballot.8 Thus, the issue
advisory opinion on a theoretical question. "[W]e cannot pass on the constitutionality
of proposed legislation," the court said, "whether by bills introduced in the House or
Senate, or measures proposed as initiatives until . . . the bill or measure has been
enacted into law." State ex rel O'Connell v. Kramer, 73 Wn. 2d 85, 87, 436 P.2d 786,
787 (1968).
It is now likely that a court will have to decide this issue. In 1968, 60,000 Massa-
chusetts voters signed an initiative petition that would authorize a 1970 state election
on the question of calling a 1971 Massachusetts constitutional convention. The initiative
was framed as a legislative initiative with convention proponents hoping to exercise the
Massachusetts legislature's prerogative to submit the convention call issue to the elector-
ate. In the November 1968 general election this initiative was approved by the people:
885,455 to 619,392. However, opponents of the initiative and the convention brought
suit to invalidate the initiative and to restrain the Secretary of the Commonwealth from
placing the convention call proposition on the 1970 ballot. Opponents of the initiative
argued that the Massachusetts legislative initiative could not be used to place the con-
vention issue before the electorate. On February 18, 1969, the Supreme Judicial Court
for Suffolk County (the single Justice session in Equity) reserved decision and reported
the cases for determination before the full bench of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts. Cohen v. Att'y Gen., No. 14,403 and Cohen v. Sec. of the Common-
wealth, No. 14,404 (Mass., filed Aug. 14, 1969). These cases were argued on February
4, 1970, but no decision has yet been reached. See also Gallagher, New Action in Reform
Battle, Boston Herald, Jan. 8, 1969, at 24. EDITOR'S NOTE: These cases were decided
shortly before publication-see Editor's note on page 591 infra.
8 WASH. CONST. art II (including the initiative provisions) provides in part:
Article Il
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 1. LEGISLATIVE POWERS, WHERE VESTED-The legislative au-
thority of the State of Washington shall be vested in the legislature, consisting of
a senate and house of representatives, which shall be called the legislature of the
State of Washington, but the people reserve to themselves the power to propose
bills, laws, and to enact or reject the same at the polls, independent of the legisla-
ture, and also reserve power, at their own option, to approve or reject at the polls
any act, item, section or part of any bill, act or law passed by the legislature.
(a) Initiative: The first power reserved by the people is the initiative ...
[Note: Signature requirements superceded by Art. 2, Sec. 1(A), AMENDMENT 30.)
Initiative petitions shall be filed with the secretary of state not less than four
months before the election at which they are to be voted upon, or not less than
ten days before any regular session of the legislature. If filed at least four months
before the election at which they are to be voted upon, he shall submit the same
to the vote of the people at the said election. If such petitions are filed not less
than ten days before any regular session of the legislature, he shall transmit the
same to the legislature as soon as it convenes and organizes. Such initiative measure
shall take precedence over all other measures in the legislature except appropriation
bills and shall be either enacted or rejected without change or amendment by the
legislature before the end of such regular session. If any such initiative measure
shall be enacted by the legislature it shall be subject to the referendum petition, or
it may be enacted and referred by the legislature to the people for approval or
rejection at the next regular election. If it is rejected or if no action is taken upon
it by the legislature before the end of such regular session, the secretary of state
shall submit it to the people for approval or rejection at the next ensuing regular
general election. The legislature may reject any measure so proposed by initiative
538
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posed is: May the popular initiative be employed to place before the
Washington voters the question of holding a constitutional conven-
tion?9
It is submitted that the initiative provisions of the Washington
State constitution provide a legal means for calling a constitutional
convention.' 0 The propositions that support this conclusion are sum-
marized below as an outline for the discussion which follows.
petition and propose a different one dealing with the same subject, and in such
event both measures shall be submitted by the secretary of state to the people for
approval or rejection at the next ensuing regular general election....
(d)" . The veto power of the governor shall not extend to measures initiated
by or referred to the people. All elections on measures referred to the people of
the state shall be had at the biennial regular elections, except when the legislature
shall order a special election. Any measure initiated by the people or referred to
the people as herein provided shall take effect and become the law if it is ap-
proved by a majority of the votes cast thereon: Provided, That the vote cast upon
such question or measure shall equal one-third of the total votes cast at such
election and not otherwise. Such measure shall be in operation on and after the
thirtieth day after the election at which it is approved. . . The whole number of
electors who voted for governor at the regular gubernatorial election last preceding
the filing of any petition for the initiative or for the referendum shall be the
basis on which the number of legal voters necessary to sign such petition shall be
counted .... All such petitions shall be filed with the secretary of state, who shall
be guided by the general laws in submitting the same to the people until additional
legislation shall especially provide therefor. This section is self-executing, but
legislation may be enacted especially to facilitate its operation.
(L. 1911, p. 136, Sec. 1.) AMENDMENT 7. Approved November, 1912.
Section I(A). INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM, SIGNATURES RE-
QUIRED-Hereafter, the number of valid signatures of legal voters required upon
a petition for an initiative measure shall be equal to eight per centum of the
number of voters registered and voting for the office for governor at the last
preceding regular gubernatorial election. . . . These provisions supersede the
requirements specified in section 1 of this article as amended by the seventh
amendment to the Constitution of this state. (L. 1955, p. 1860, SJ.R. No. 4).
AMENDMENT 30. Approved November, 1956.
WASH. CONsT. art. II, § 41 (relating to amendment of initiatives) provides:
Section 41. LAWS, EFFECTIVE DATE. INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM-
AMENDMENT OR REPEAL. No act, law, or bill subject to referendum shall
take effect until ninety days after the adjournment of the session at which it was
enacted. No act, law, or bill approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon
shall be amended or repealed by the legislature within a period of two years
following such enactment: Provided, That any such act, law or bill may be amended
within two years after such enactment at any regular or special session of the
legislature by a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to each house. ...
But such enactment may be amended or repealed at any general regular or special
election by direct vote of the people thereon. . . . (L. 1951, p. 959, S.J.R. No. 7.)
AMENDMENT 26. Approved November, 1952.
9When reference is made in this paper to "constitutional convention" the reference
is to a convention that has authority to propose revisions in a state constitution. This
reference should not be misconstrued to mean a convention that is "constitutionally
instituted." This latter matter is the topic of the comment itself.
"hWlle the research supporting this conclusion involved dozens of books and articles,
several secondary sources of particular importance require special identification at this
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SUMMARY OF PROPOSITIONS
I. THE UNDERLYING THEORY
Alterations in governmental structure must conform to some notion
of legitimacy. The traditional conception of legitimate change requires
that the existing government specify in its constitution some procedure
by which the form of government may be altered. Changes in govern-
ment not conforming to the specified procedure would not be recog-
nized. However, the traditional notion of constitutional change has
been supplanted by tenets of popular sovereignty. According to popular
sovereignty theory, the people retain the inherent right to alter their
government however and whenever they desire, and provisions for
change in existing constitutions neither create nor restrict this inherent
right.
II. THE EFFECT OF PARTICULAR CONSTITUTIONAL PRO.
VISIONS ON CHANGES BY OTHER LAWFUL MEANS
The Washington constitution of 1889 provides that the legislature
shall determine when to place the issue of constitutional reform before
the voters. The State Supreme Court has not ruled whether this pre-
point. First, there have been three major studies of state constitutional conventions:
1) J. JAMESON, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS; THEIR HISTORY,
POWERS, AND MODES OF PROCEEDING (4th ed. 1887) [hereinafter cited as JAmESON].
This comprehensive study (684 pages) is discussed in great detail in note 19, infra.
2) V. DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1910) [herein-
after cited as DODD]. While Jameson's work emphasizes both history and theory,
Dodd's study is mainly historical. According to Hoar, Dodd was influenced by the fact
that he wrote in Illinois, where the only conventions were those authorized by the
Constitution. HOAR, infra this note, at 165.
3) R. HOAR, CONSTITUTIONAL CONvENTIONS: THEm NATURE, PowER, AND LIMITATIONS
(1917) [hereinafter cited as HOAR]. Like Jameson, Hoar considered both history and
theory. Because of the facts discussed in note 19, infra, Hoar's book must be considered
the soundest from a theoretical standpoint.
In addition, reference should be made to some recent unpublished studies of the
specific issue of calling a constitutional convention by initiative. These studies were
prepared by advocates of calling a convention by initiative. Though the reasoning
in all three is sound, their bias must be kept in mind.
4) ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF WASIINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION INITIATIVE
(Tentative Draft, August 18, 1967) (Available from Office of Attorney General,
Olympia, Washington) [hereinafter cited as ATT'v. GEN. DRAFrT].
5) S. L. Sutcliffe, Calling a Constitutional Convention by Initiative in Washington
(unpublished manuscript, University of Washington, School of Law 1967.)
6) Brief for Relator, State ex rel. O'Connell v. Kramer, 73 Wn. 2d 85, 436 P.2d 786
(1968) [Hereinafter cited as ATT'Y. GEN. BRIEF.
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scribed procedure is exclusive; however one state court and some
scholars have relied on the maxim, expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, to implement the traditional notion of legitimacy requiring
absolute adherence to the one prescribed method.1 More recent court
decisions have rejected this traditional doctrine. 2 There are two major
grounds for this rejection. First, the initiation of a constitutional con-
vention is viewed as an inherent legislative power that cannot be
restricted by affirmative constitutional provisions proclaiming a single
method of revision. Specific provisions for revision are seen as addi-
tional rather than as exclusive methods for effecting constitutional
reform. Second, the use of legislative power to convene a constitutional
convention is viewed as an exercise of the people's reserved power of
sovereignty and not as an exercise of power delegated and restricted
by the constitution.
III. USE OF THE POPULAR INITIATIVE TO CONVENE A
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
The Washington State Supreme Court has said that the people, as
a sovereignty, may exercise all legislative power through the popular
initiative.3 Whether convening a convention is held to be a granted or
an inherent legislative power, the electorate, through the initiative,
may exercise this power. Though no court has ever decided this issue,
the authorities suggest that a constitutional convention may be called
by initiative. 4
I. THE UNDERLYING THEORY
A. Need for Legitimacy
Before approaching directly the obstdcles to convening a constitu-
tional convention by initiative, it should prove useful to study the
'In re The Constitutional Convention, 14 R.I. 649 (1883) overruled by In re
Opinion to the Governor, 55 R.I. 56, 178 A. 433 (1935).
2Gatewood v. Matthews, 403 S.W.2d 716, 721 (Ky. 1966); Board of Supervisors v.
Attorney Gen., 246 Md. 417, 229 A.2d 388, 396-97 (1967); and Stander v. Kelley, 433
Pa. 406, 250 A.2d 474, 479 (1969).
"State v. Paul, 87 Wash. 83, 90, 151 P. 114, 116 (1915); Love v. King County,
181 Wash. 462, 467, 44 P.2d 175, 177 (1935).
"DODD at 54; HOAR at 58; A. STUM, METHODS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RTOM
84 n.2, 120 (1954). See also White, Amendment and Revision of State Constitutions,
100 PA. L. Rxv. 1132, 1139 (1952).
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theoretical underpinnings since, possibly with regard to this contro-
versy more than others, political philosophy has been the determining
factor in the decisions of judges, legal scholars and political observers.
The theoretical starting point for discussions of constitutional re-
form is the assumption that alterations of the structure of government
must conform to notions of legitimacy. Generally, legitimate means
lawful, so as conceptions of lawfulness change, the requirements for
what constitute legitimate alterations in the form of government will
also change. The meaning of legitimacy will be rooted in the com-
munity's philosophy as of a given time in history. 5 Whatever the
community's conception of legitimacy at a particular time, alteration
of the structure of government must conform to that conception or
else the alteration will be deemed revolutionary, the courts will declare
it unlawful and void, and the existing government will ignore it.16
There are many conceptions of legitimacy, each relating to the
manner in which the change in governmental structure occurs. For
example, a change by an authorized procedure is legitimized by the
charter or constitution of the existing government. Or, change made in
some unauthorized manner may be legitimized by the affirmative will
of the people expressed in a lawful fashion.'
" See generally H. LASSWEL.L & A. KAPLA, POWER AND SOCIs'r (1950) and Parsons,
Authority, Legitimation, and Political Action in C. FRIEDRICH, AUTHORITY 197 (1958).
" An example of the problems that attend an illegitimate change in government can
be seen in the constitutional struggle in Rhode Island in 1841 and 1842. This struggle,
popularly known as the Dorr War, grew out of dissatisfaction with the extremely
undemocratic suffrage qualifications established under the 1663 Charter of Charles II
by which the State was still being governed in 1841. Since the state legislature had a
vested interest in the existing structure it had ignored repeated pleas for relief. The
populace formed political associations and convened a constitutional convention-a
convention totally unauthorized by the existing Charter or government. The new
constitution drafted by this convention was approved in an irregular election by the
majority of the state's male citizens. When the newly elected governor, Thomas Dorr,
tried to form a government under this constitution, armed conflict ensued with the
Charter government. In one of the famous incidents of this struggle, Luther Borden, a
militiaman of the Charter government, arrested one Martin Luther, a Dorr supporter,
for treason. The conflict was ended when President Tyler threw the support of the
United States behind the Charter government. For an exciting account of the Dorr
War, see A. MowRy, THz DoRa WAR (1901). See also Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 1 (1849).
"THoar saw three ways people can change their government: "(1) by some authorized
procedure; (2) by a lawful act of the whole people in their sovereign capacity; or
(3) by the spontaneous act of an unrepresentative part of the people." HoAR at 15. He
explains in more detail that change by some authorized procedure means change by
"some method provided by the charter or constitution under which the State in
question is governed, or by the express permission of some sovereign government . . ."
as in the case where Congress authorizes a territory to form a new government as a
542
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B. According to Traditional Legitimacy Theory Change Must Be
Expressly Authorized
The traditional conception of legitimate change requires that the
existing government specify in its constitution some procedure by
which the form of government may be altered. To merit the badge
of legitimacy all change must strictly conform to the specified pro-
cedure. As Professor Cooley, an eminent constitutional scholar of the
nineteenth century, once observed: "[T]he written instrument comes
into existence with the understanding and purpose that its several
paragraphs and provisions shall mean exactly what they mean when
adopted; and if a change is to take place in the constitution, it must
be brought about by steps which in the instrument itself are provided
for .... )18
The foremost proponent of the traditional notion of legitimate
change was Judge John Alexander Jameson, author of A TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS; THIm HISTORY, POWERS, AND MODES
OF PROCEEDING. 9 Jameson found this theory a logical extension of the
prerequisite to statehood. Id. Change by a lawful act of the whole people in their
sovereign capacity means an extraconstitutional change deriving its validity from the
inherent power of the people. Id. at 221. Change by the spontaneous act of an un-
representative part of the people means a change or attempted change by "a part of
the people or even a majority [who have no power] ... except by force to bind those
who do not join the movement." Id. at 16.
Similar classifications were propounded by the court in Wells v. Bain, 75 Pa. 39, 47
(1874).
18T. COoLEy, MIcHGAN: A isToRy OF GOvE~m'imqTs 345 (5th ed. 1890). Cooley
is best known for A TREATISE ON THE CONsTITUTIONAL LInMTATIONS (7th ed. 1903).
Though now largely dated by its theory, the work is still occasionally cited to support
conservative theories of constitutional interpretation. As Cooley noted there:
By the constitution which they [the sovereign people] establish, they not only
tie up the hands of their official agencies, but their own hands as well; and neither
the officers of the State, nor the whole people as an aggregate body, are at liberty
to take action in opposition to this fundamental law.
T. COOLEY, A TEATISE ON THE CoNsTIUTIoNAL LmrmITATIONS 56 (7th ed. 1903).
" Jameson, a judge of the Chicago, Illinois, Superior Court, first published his
treatise in 1867. It was the authoritative source of the period. Even today, Jameson's
work is the most comprehensive historical and theoretical source in the field though,
HoAR supra note 10, is sounder from a theoretical standpoint. The problem with
Jameson's book is, as Dodd observes:
Judge Jameson's work constructed a theory regarding constitutional conventions,
which conformed more or less closely to the facts, but in which the facts were
subordinated to the theory.
DoDD supra note 10, at vi.
Judge Jameson's work may be said to have been written to disprove the theory
that a convention has sovereign power, and under these conditions the theory
assumed in his mind a much more important position than it ever attained in fact
Id. at 77 n.10.
Under Judge Jameson's theory . . . [tihe convention is made subordinate to an
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"legitimacy of blood" rule used to sustain European monarchical
succession. In Europe, the legitimacy of governments depended upon
the personal legitimacy of the occupant of the throne. Thus, to render
a government legitimate it was the rule that the successor to power
had to be the offspring of the reigning monarch and his queen, con-
ceived and born in lawful wedlock during their joint occupancy of
the throne. The importance of the rule was made apparent by the
European wars of succession that occurred before the rule was estab-
lished. 0 As Jameson saw it, the doctrine of legitimacy was applicable
in the United States in similar terms and for the same reasons. He
stated: " [T] o be lawful or legitimate, successive forms of government
must be the offspring, regularly and lawfully begotten, the later of the
earlier .... A system of government . . must itself govern . . the
matter of reproducing or repairing itself ... "
organ of the existing government. . . . The convention loses a large part of its
usefulness as an organ of the state if it be treated as strictly subject to control
by the regular legislative body.
Id. at 77, 79.
Others were more blunt. According to Hoar, Jameson wrote "to support a pre-
conceived theory, in the interests of which theory [he] freely distorted both law and
facts." HOAR at vii. Van Host, the author of VERFASSUNG UND DEMOKRATIE DER
VEREINGTEN STAATEN, wrote in Sybel's 32 HisToRIscHE ZEITCIIERI that Jameson "has
allowed himself to be led astray in his political thinking by the history of secession."
JAMESON at 656. Jameson admits that this criticism is well-founded. JA1,rsoN at 656-57.
His book was what the Germans call a tendenz work, one "written to maintain a par-
ticular thesis"-in this case "the subordination of the constitutional convention to
the law of the land." Every work on history or constitutional law, Jameson observed,
was written "from some special point of view to establish truths, of which the author
was strongly convinced . . . ." As to his own book, the author righteously concedes:
This work was written whilst our armies were fighting the rebellion, and to main-
tain the same thesis for which they fought,-that these States are a nation, that
State rights in the Southern sense were a political heresy, and that secession was
treason; written, in short, every line of it, literally, to the beating of the Union
drums.
Id. at 657.
Because Jameson felt that the people of the South had been stampeded to revolt
by the secessionist constitutional conventions he felt compelled to proclaim the "true
principle, that a government, once established, represents the sovereign, and that . . .
while that government survives" only its legislature can call a constitutional convention
which "shall meet, if at all, under conditions prescribed by such legislature . . . ." Id.
2'JAAMESON at 99-100. See generally J. FIGGIS, TiE DivnZE RIGHtT OF KYNGS
(2d ed. 1914).
'JAMEsoN at 100. Strictly speaking there is a theoretical distinction between legitimacy
as Jameson understood that notion in early European political thought and the more
modern political significance of the doctrine. In fact, Max Weber saw three categories:
1) "charismatic" legitimacy-a popular hero's claim to authority; 2) "traditional"
legitimacy-authority springing from dynastic succession; and 3) "rational" legit-
imacy-the prevailing notion that legal theorists often understand to mean legality
and which Weber described as "acquiscence in enactments that are formally correct
and which have been made according to established procedure." Weber, Wirtschaft
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Applying this legitimacy theory to constitutional alteration, Jame-
son concluded that a constitutional convention initiated by "unofficial
persons ... by persons acting as private citizens, but giving expression,
perhaps, to a general desire," would be "illegitimate."22 Such a con-
vention "has nothing official in it, and can bind no one by its proceed-
ings. If it affect to frame a law or a Constitution, and put it in force,
its action is revolutionary.123 According to Jameson, the legitimate
mode of calling a constitutional convention was by "an authentic act
of the sovereign body acting through some branch of the existing gov-
ernment representing it" and this branch was the legislature.24
This legitimate manner of initiating a constitutional convention was
set out in the constitution itself. In most cases, according to Judge
Jameson, the constitutionally prescribed modes for altering the con-
stitution were "permissive, pointing out modes in which Conventions
may be called . . . without terms of restriction, or allusion to other
possible modes." But, Jameson continued:25
However liberal these provisions may seem to be, restriction is really the
policy and law of the country. By the common law of America ... it is
settled, that amendments to our Constitutions are to be made only in
modes pointed out or sanctioned by the legislative authority .... The
mode usually employed is that of summoning a Convention; and it is
clear that no means are legitimate for the purpose indicated but conven-
tions, unless employed under an express warrant of the Constitution. The
idea of the people thus restricting themselves in making changes in their
Constitutions is original, and is one of the most signal evidences that
amongst us liberty means, not the giving of rein to passion or to thought-
less impulse, but the exercise of power by the people for the general good,
and therefore, always under the restraints of law.
C. The Flexible Principles of Popular Sovereignty Have Supplanted
Traditional Legitimacy Theory
The traditional theory of legitimate constitutional change, requiring
strict adherence to an authorized procedure, never attained a position
und Gesellschaft in M. Rums=EN, MAX WEBER ON LAW 3N EcoNom AsM SoCIETY
3, 9, 336-7 (1954). Note: references to "traditional legitimacy theory" in this paper
are not references to Weber's second category; rather, they are references to a type
of Weber's third category.
' JAuMSoN at 104-5.
"Id. at 105.
"Id. at 106, 109-11.
"Id. at 548-49.
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of pre-eminence. Even during the height of the doctrine in the latter
part of the nineteenth century, courts were relying instead on notions
of popular sovereignty to facilitate constitutional revision by pro-
cedures other than those provided for in the state constitutions.2 6 By
the twentieth century, legal theorists and courts alike had rejected the
traditional theory of legitimacy as a basis for restricting popularly
ordained constitutional changes." Indeed, since the doctrine of popular
sovereignty had become embedded in American political thought as
early as the Revolution, it may be appropriate to view the restrictive
traditional theory of legitimate constitutional change as a mere tempo-
rary aberration in an otherwise consistent pattern of adherence to the
flexible tenets of popular sovereignty.
Popular sovereignty, the notion that all governments derive their
just authority from the consent of the people, was the most funda-
mental right asserted by the American colonists at the time of the
Revolution. The colonists insisted that government was created and
controlled by a contract between the people and the state .2  They
expressed this principle in the Declaration of Independence:
[W] e hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed with certain unalienable Rights, that among these
are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to receive these
rights, Governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers
from the consent of the governed, that whenever any Form of Government
becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or
abolish it, and institute new Government, laying its foundation on such
principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem
most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness....
Many state constitutions contain a like assertion of popular sover-
'See, e. g., Bradford v. Shine, 13 Fla. 393 (1871). This and similar decisions will be
discussed in Part II, infra.
'See, e.g., HOAR; Ellingham v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336, 99 N.E. 1 (1912); Gatewood v.
Matthews, 403 S.W.2d 716 (Ky. 1966).
'The origins and viability of the contract theory of government have been the
subject of numerous essays and studies and this comment will not delve into that
matter. See generally J. GOUGH, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (2d ed. 1957). Suffice it to say
that Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau were each contract theorists, who assuming different
conditions in the state of nature, developed different conceptions of the governmental
contract. The contract theory adopted by the American colonists was modeled most
closely after the thoughts of Locke, who viewed the state of nature as a condition of
peace and mutual asistance. See J. LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1690),
especially book II, and J. LocKE, oF CxII GOVERNMENT §§ 3, 91, 131. See generally
A. Grams, Az ArzRxCA PoLTrcAL THOUGHT (1960), chs. 1-5.
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eignty.20 Illustrative is the provision in the constitution of Washing-
ton: o
All political power is inherent in the people, and governments derive their
just power from the consent of the governed, and are established to pro-
tect and maintain individual rights.
According to this theory, the institution of government-constitu-
tion-making and revision-is an incident of popular sovereignty. As
one observer put it: "The constitutional system. . . may be summed
up in the formula: the sovereign people itself establishes its constitu-
tion." A constitutional convention therefore would derive its author-
ity to propose constitutional revision from the people themselves and
not from any provision in the existing constitution.82
It is at this point that the departure from the traditional legitimacy
theory is most severe. While the traditional theory would require the
existing constitution itself to make provision for a convention, it is the
position of those subscribing to the popular sovereignty doctrine that
there need be "no reservation in the organic law to preserve to the
people their inherent power to change their government."3 The Honor-
able Reverdy Johnson, a United States Senator from Maryland, stated
the doctrine thus: 4
No man denies that the American principle is well settled, that all gov-
ernments originate with the people, and may by like authority be abolished
'Hoar cites those constitutions of the original thirteen states that included a
declaration of popular sovereignty similar to the Declaration of Independence. HoAR
at 13-14.
'WAs . CONST. art. 1, § 1. Similarly, MASS. CONST. Preamble and Declaration of
Rights, art. vii reads:
The Body Politic is formed by a voluntary association of individuals: it is a
social compact, by which the whole people covenants with each Citizen, and each
Citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain Laws for the
Common good ....
The people alone have an incontestable, unalienable, and indefeasible right
to institute government; and to reform, alter, or totally change the same, when
their protection, safety, prosperity, and happiness require it.
C. BORGEAUD, ETABLIssEMENT ET REvISION DES CoNsITUTIONS EN AinmRQuE ET EN
EURoPE 218 (1893). The text is an English translation by the author of this comment.
The original French reads: "Le systime constituant ... se r6sume en cette formule: le
peuple souverain itablissant lui-m~ne sa constitution."
2HoAR at 12-14, 52, 80.
'Ellingham v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336, 344, 99 N.E. 1, 4 (1912).
"'Letter to William D. Bowie and others, dated October 7, 1864, published in the
New York Daily Tribune of June 5, 1865, as quoted in Board of Supervisors v. At-
torney Gen., 246 Md. 417, 229 A.2d 388, 396-97 n,3 (1967). Jameson criticizes Johnson's
argument. JAa!Esox at 598-600.
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or modified; and, that it is not within the power of the people, even for
themselves, to surrender this right, much less to surrender it for those who
are to succeed them. A provision, therefore, in the Constitution of any one
of the United States, limiting the right of the people to abolish or modify
it, would be simply void.
To properly appreciate this theory, that a constitutional convention
derives its authority directly from the people and not from the existing
constitution, it is necessary to distinguish between a convention's con-
stitution-making power and a legislature's law-making authority. This
distinction follows from the difference in nature between a constitution
and a statute. A constitution, because of its basic nature, is established
by authority delegated directly from the people. A statute, on the
other hand, is "enacted by authority assigned under the constitution
and only indirectly delegated by the people" according to the prin-
ciples of representative democracy." The courts in particular have
consistently emphasized this distinction.3"
It is the constitutional convention that exercises constitution-making
power and the legislature that exercises law-making authority; and,
while the legislature's authority comes from the constitution, the con-
"ATT'Y GEN. BRxr, supra note 10, at 11. The delegation of some legislative power
to the legislature is a basic principle of representative government. Obviously, with
a Washington electorate of approximately a million and a half voters it would be
impossible for the people to govern themselves directly. Thus the legislature has been
given the power to enact statutes. The legislature has also been empowered to propose
a constitutional convention, but, this is not authority to adopt a constitution. That
authority the people never surrender. Accordingly,
[ilt should be clearly understood that the . . . Constitution and any action on
the part of the General Assembly which might be employed to facilitate the
convening of . . . a convention in no way circumscribe or limit the authority of
the convention. While . . . [the] provisions of the [c]onstitution and such legisla-
tive actions as are taken under them tend to give a semblance of legal continuity
to . . . constitutional development, they are mere vehicles of convenience and in
no sense affect the ultimate legality of the power of the people in convention as-
sembled to change the fundamental law of the state.
R. UHL, R. STOUDEM1RE & G. SnERRILL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENIoNs 3 (1951).
SE.g., Ellingham v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336, 99 N.E. 1, 4 (1912):
A "Constitution" is legislation direct from the people acting in their sovereign
capacity, while a "statute" is legislation from their representatives, subject to
limitations prescribed by the superior authority.
And, Board of Supervisors v. Attorney Gen., 246 Md. 417, 229 A.2d 388, 394 (1967):
Essentially, a constitution is fundamental legislation directly by the people acting
politically in their sovereign capacity, while a law is a rule of conduct prescribed
by the legislative agents of the people under and subject to delegated limitations
of the previously ordained superior legislation, the Constitution.
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vention's power comes directly from the people who approve its call,
elect its delegates, and ultimately pass on its product.W Because of
this, Hoar could say of constitutional conventions: C1[t]heir validity
rests not upon constitutional provision nor upon legislative act, but
upon the fundamental sovereignty of the people themselves."3"
Popular sovereignty theory was found to be so persuasive by one
court that approval of a new constitution by the electorate was held
sufficient to legitimize a constitution even though it had been drafted
and proposed (to the electorate) in a manner totally inconsistent with
that prescribed by the existing constitution. In 1871 a Pennsylvania
constitutional convention was called in a way not provided for in the
Pennsylvania constitution of 1838. The convention met in 1872, and
in 1873 the voters approved, in an irregular election, the product of
the irregularly convened convention. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
though decrying the illegality of the procedure, concluded: "The
change made by the people in their political institutions, by the
adoption of the proposed Constitution ....forbids an inquiry into
the merits of this case." 39 Even traditional legitimacy theorists, such
as Jameson, had to concede that a popular election could validate an
irregularily passed constitution since it was obvious that the popular
will, once executed, could be reversed only with great difficulty.40
Further, relying on the popular will to legitimize constitutional
'ATT'Y. GEN. BRunr, supra note 10, at 11.
3HoAR at 52.
' Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa. 59, 68-9 (1874). Opponents of the irregular 1872 conven-
tion sought an injunction to prevent submission of the new constitution to the people.
The lower court denied the injunction and before review could be obtained the election
had occurred and the people had approved the new constitution.
While not invalidating the new constitution, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Wells v. Bain, 75 Pa. 39 (1874) and Wood's Appeal, strongly criticized the procedure.
'
0 Jameson admitted:
A Constitution . .. originating in a convention justly stigmatized as illegitimate,
may, notwithstanding its origin, become valid as a fundamental law. This may
happen in two ways: namely, first, by its adoption by the electoral body, according
to the forms of existing laws; or, secondly, by the mere acquiescence of the sovereign
society . . . .The ratification . ..would be a direct exercise of sovereign power
.which it would be folly to gainsay.
JAisEsoN at 112.
Concerning the Pennsylvania experience, Jameson had to conclude: "the Constitu-
tion framed by the Convention had been submitted to and adopted by the people
... ; and thus, however irregular, or even revolutionary, its inception had been, it had
become the fundamental law of the State, and the Supreme Court must accept it as
such." Id. at 407.
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change can be very advantageous. As one participant in reform sug-
gested: 41
If you make the constitution and laws at all times subject to the control
of the people, through a prudent and cautious mode of exercising their
power, expressly pointed out and regulated, you produce a trebly advan-
tageous effect. First, you make the people contented in the consciousness
of their power and authority. Second, you check the rash propensity to
change, by the consciousness that one can make a change when one pleases,
and hence there is no urgency for doing it precipitiously or inconsiderately.
Third, you secure the people against the dangers of despotism, which
always accompany the making of changes in an irregular and undefined
manner.
Most important, a recognition of popular sovereignty facilitates peace-
ful constitutional change. The problem with oppressive legal restric-
tions on the popular will is that such restrictions often leave the elec-
torate no recourse but revolution. As one authority observed: "Search
all history and you will find that the prominent cause of violent revo-
lution, both those which have, and those which have not, terminated in
despotisms, has been the feeling of the people that they were burdened
with shackles, . . . and they could obtain relief only by violent
measures.7 42
Finally, even mere attempts at revision by the populace may im-
prove chances for legislative action. Consider a series of events that
occurred in Maryland in 1837. There, supporters of reform of the
Maryland constitution elected a constitutional convention without
any authorization from the existing government. In fact, the existing
government denounced the rump convention as revolutionary and
threatened to prosecute its participants. No more action was necessary
since the Maryland General Assembly rapidly incorporated the most
important reforms in constitutional amendments.43 Likewise, there can
be little doubt that one reason the Washington Legislature seriously
considered a "gateway amendment" during the 1969 session was the
"Thomas Earle, delegate to the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention of 1837-38
quoted in BORGEAUD, supra note 31 at 166-67. This is the author's translation of the
original French text.
2 BORGEAUD, supra note 31 at 166-67. This is the author's translation of the original
French text.
' JAMESoN at 216; HoAR at 20; DODD at 61.
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near success of the initiative movement of 1968. Threatened with a
constitutional convention beyond their control, the Washington legis-
lators, like their nineteenth century Maryland counterparts, sought
constitutional reform drafted by the legislature.
In summary, during the latter part of the nineteenth century tradi-
tional legitimacy theory gained enough influence to convince some
writers that constitutional conventions could be convened, if at all,
only according to the procedure authorized by the existing constitution.
This restrictive interpretation of legitimacy theory was eventually
eroded by the tenets of popular sovereignty, the doctrine upon which
the American states were founded after the Revolution. As will be
demonstrated in the following Part, today, while the traditional notion
of legitimacy has only a minimal following, the doctrine of popular
sovereignty is being consistently relied upon to justify extraconstitu-
tional changes in the structure of state government.
II. THE EFFECT OF PARTICULAR CONSTITUTIONAL PRO-
VISIONS ON CHANGES BY OTHER LAWFUL MEANS
A. Methods for Determining the Will of the Electorate
Before studying in detail the scope of the popular initiative in
Washington, a primary inquiry is whether particular provisions for
revision in an existing constitution preclude, by their very existence,
other reasonable means of achieving the same goal. At the outset it
should be clear that, since constitutional reform must represent the
authentic will of the people, there must be some method to determine
the voters' position on the issue. The electorate must be polled as to
their desires for or against convening a convention. Also, there must be
some mechanism to provide for election of delegates and the submis-
sion of the proposed constitution to the electorate.
Traditionally, this function has been performed by state legislatures
exercising ordinary legislative power to assist the calling of a constitu-
tional convention.4 4 Both Cooley and Jameson felt this to be the most
desirable method since they saw the legislatures as "being closest to
" DODD at 48 et seq.
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the people" and best adapted to "a wise balancing of expediencies.1 415
Determining the will of the people on the question of a constitu-
tional convention can be accomplished in other ways. Indeed, frequent
experience with the reluctance of legislatures to even submit the ques-
tion to the people led some states to adopt alternative mechanisms.
Both the Pennsylvania constitution of 1776 and the Vermont consti-
tution of 1777, for example, provided for Councils of Censors that
might call conventions or submit the issue to the electorate. While
Vermont experienced a measure of success with this institution, it was
found by the Pennsylvanians that the Council could be just as obstruc-
tive as a legislature.46
The most frequently used tool for circumventing legislatures has
been the submission into constitutions of a requirement that the elec-
torate be automatically consulted at specified, periodic elections as
to their desire for a convention. This method of providing for a
convention when the people desire one is in accord with the principles
of popular sovereignty and has the approval of many authorities.
Hoar felt that:48
[i]t is preferable that this machinery [for determining the will of the
electorate] be provided in detail by the constitution, as the people will
11 COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 18, at 56,
59-60; JAMESON at 109-12. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has described this legisla-
tive function in the following terms: "When a law becomes the instrumental process
of amendment, it is not because the legislature possesses any inherent power to change
the existing constitution through a convention, but because it is the only means through
which an authorized consent of the whole people, the entire state, can be lawfully
obtained in a state of peace." Wells v. Bain, 75 Pa. 39, 47 (1874).
"JAMESON at 212-14; HOAR at 51-2.
' DODo at 50 et seq. Dodd reports that:
The plan of fixing definite terms for the submission of this question has not gained
in favor as against the arrangement for submission at the legislative discretion ...
The legislatures have ordinarily been found responsive to popular sentiment in
this respect.
Id. at 51. Contra: Id. at 292.
5 HOAR at 224. See also DODD at 56-57.
Commenting on a periodic submission device in the 1846 New York Constitution,
another authority observed:
Not merely is the popular vote on the question of holding a convention to be
taken at twenty-year intervals, but the last vestige of intervention by the legisla-
ture in the matter is swept finally away. In case the people vote in the affirmative,
the constitution itself provides, minutely, for the apportionment, election, organiza-
tion, and procedure of the convention. Thus there is now imbedded in the consti-
tution of New York a complete system for total revision of the constitution of
that state beyond the control of the legislature. The people initiate, the convention
drafts, the people enact.
F. JuDsoN, ESSENTIALS OF A WRITTrN CoNsTriuTIoN 21 (1903).
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not be subject to the whim of the legislature, but may have a convention
whenever they desire to exercise their unquestionable right to have one.
Yet another mechanism for submitting the convention issue to the
electorate is some form of popular initiative. This is the tool to which
advocates of reform in Washington and Massachusetts have recently
turned.49 Although the popular initiative is a relatively new feature
in state constitutions, a mechanism very much like the modern ini-
tiative was the convention-convening instrument in an early Georgia
constitution. The Georgia constitution of 1777 provided that the
legislature should call a convention upon petition of a majority of the
counties of the state.5" Though this mechanism was never employed
to convene a convention, Dodd states that this provision was "the
first instance in which the popular initiative was sought to be given
for such a purpose."'" Borgeaud, who liked the idea of automatic
periodic submissions, favored, above all, the popular initiative ap-
proach, often citing the success of the Swiss experience with this
method of convening constitutional conventions.52
B. Can a Convention Be Called Only by the Legislature?
Of the many ways to ascertain the will of the people on the con-
vention issue, the Washington constitution of 1889 specifies only the
most common. Article XXII provides:ra
Whenever two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the legis-
lature shall deem it necessary to call a convention to revise or amend this
Constitution, they shall recommend to the electors to vote at the next
general election, for or against a convention, and if a majority of all the
electors voting at said election shall have voted for a convention, the
legislature shall at the next session, provide by law for calling the same;
and such convention shall consist of a number of members, not less than
that of the most numerous branch of the legislature.
Jameson would describe this provision as "permissive"-the provision
points out a method by which a convention may be called but does
See notes 6 and 7 supra and accompanying text.
I GA. CONST. art. 63 (1777). DODD at 28, 42, 48.
OIDODD at 48.
1 BORGEAUD, supra note 31, at 220.
'"WAsH. CoNsT. art. XXIII, § 2.
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not include a prohibition, or even an allusion, to other possible meth-
ods. 4 But, according to the traditional notion of legitimate constitu-
tional change, there must be absolute adherence to the procedure
which the Washington constitution prescribes for its own alteration.
Whether traditional legitimacy theory would render article XXIII
the exclusive means of constitutional revision in Washington is un-
known. Since the Washington legislature has never proposed a con-
vention and, since the initiative approach had not been considered
until 1968, the Washington courts have not had an opportunity to
decide the issue. Despite the absence of a decision directly in point,
it would be helpful to study the little Washington law that might be
applicable to the issue since a determination of the exclusiveness of
article XXIII is a key to further analysis.
The decision of the Washington State Supreme Court in State ex
rel. O'Connell v. Meyers55 suggests that the court would not rely on
traditional legitimacy theory to invalidate procedures for constitu-
tional revision not mentioned in the constitution. This case arose
when the legislature thoroughly revised, by amendment, a popular
initiative measure redistricting the legislature." Following the legis-
lative action, the Attorney General sought a writ of mandamus to
compel the Secretary of State to redistrict the state in accordance
with the original provisions of the initiative.
The Attorney General contended that since article II, section 3 of
the Washington state constitution detailed the manner and timing
of legislative redistricting, the legislature could not adopt another
procedure (e.g., amendment of an initiative) to accomplish the same
end.5 7 The court refused to accept this argument that article II, sec-
6'See JAMESoN at note 25 supra and accompanying text.
5 1 Wn. 2d 454, 319 P.2d 828 (1957).
The twenty-sixth amendment to the constitution permitted the legislature to amend
popular initiative measures within two years of their passage so long as two-thirds of
each house of the legislature concurred. For the text of Amendment 26, see WASH.
CONST. art. II, § 41 quoted in note 8 supra.
In O'Connell v. Meyers, the legislative amendment was a complete substitution of
the legislature's redistricting scheme for the scheme approved by the passage of the
initiative. O'Connell v. Meyers, 51 Wn. 2d 454, 319 P.2d 828 (1957).
"O'Connell v. Meyers, 51 Wn. 2d 454, 319 P.2d 828 (1957). The Attorney General,
in arguing the invalidity of the legislature's amendment of the redistricting initiative,
pointed to article II, section 3 of the Washington constitution. WAsH. CONST. art. II,
§ 3 specifies:
The legislature shall provide by law for an enumeration of the inhabitants of the
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tion 3 was an exclusive means for redistricting. "[I]t is a familiar
rule," said the court, "that the state constitution -is a limitation upon,
rather than a grant of, legislative power; that the legislature may
enact any law not expressly or inferentially prohibited by the constitu-
tion of the state .... "Is The court concluded: 59
In the absence of specific words of limitation, an express enumeration of
legislative powers does not exclude the exercise of others not named.
It follows that, since Art. II, § 3, contains no negative words of limita-
tion, the legislature is not precluded from redistricting as often as it
determines necessary.
The language and approach of this opinion suggests that the Wash-
ington court would not find that inclusion of article XXIII, section
2 in the state constitution (providing for a legislative proposal of a
convention) would preclude other methods of calling a constitutional
convention. Though the reasoning of the O'Connell v. Meyers decision
can only be relied upon analogously, it is significant to note that the
decision deals with an infrequently exercised, constitutionally pre-
scribed power. It could be argued that calling a constitutional conven-
tion is similar in these regards to reapportioning the state legislature.
And, though the scope of the initiative will be discussed further in
Part III of this comment, it is instructive to notice that O'Connell v.
Meyers dealt with initiative exercise of a function for which the
constitution specifically states: "The legislature shall provide by
law .... " Since article II, section 3 did not preclude reapportionment
by initiative, it may be that the Washington court would find that ar-
ticle XXIII, section 2 does not preclude calling a constitutional con-
vention by initiative. To rule otherwise it appears that the court would
have to ignore the provision in the constitution that reads:60
All political power is inherent in the people, and governments derive their
state ...every ten years . ..and at the first session after ... each enumeration
made by the authority of the United States, the legislature shall apportion and
district anew the members of the senate and house of representatives according
to the number of inhabitants.
1251 Wn. 2d at 465, 319 P.2d at 832. Burns v. Anderson, 51 Wn. 2d 810, 322 P.2d
359 (1958) might be read to the contrary.
-51 Wn. 2d at 465, 319 P.2d at 833.
I WAsHr. CoNsT. art. I, § 1.
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just powers from the consent of the governed, and are established to
protect and maintain individual rights.
Similar constitutional provisions have been cited by the Kentucky'
and Maryland 2 courts in support of rulings that existing constitu-
tional revision provisions do not preclude resort to alternative methods.
Additionally, the Washington Supreme Court has stated: "There
is little logic in arguing that the makers of the constitution 'excluded'
that which did not then exist to be excluded."63 It would make no
sense, then, to argue that the 1889 provision for legislative proposal
of a convention excluded the calling of a convention by an initiative.
The initiative provision was added twenty-three years after the 1889
constitution was adopted.
Yet the foregoing discussion is merely analogous reasoning from
decisions not directly in point. The Washington law is unsettled on
the exclusiveness of the constitutionally prescribed mode for calling
a constitutional convention. It is necessary, therefore, to study the
decisions of other courts.
C. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio A lterius
Some judges and commentators, relying on traditional legitimacy
theory, have applied the entrenched legal maxim, expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, to void constitutional change by any means other
than that provided for in the existing constitution. The expressio
unius maxim is a rule of construction providing that an explicit state-
ment of one thing implies exclusion of those alternatives not men-
tioned."4
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island relied on this maxim in 1883
to advise the state senate that the general assembly could not call a
' Gatewood v. Matthews, 403 S.IV.2d 716, 718 (Ky. 1966). See note 123 infra and
accompanying text.
"Board of Supervisors v. Attorney Gen., 246 Md. 417, 229 A.2d 388, 396-97 (1967).
See note 129 infra and accompanying text.
'State ex rel Lemon v. Langlie, 45 Wn. 2d 82, 99, 273 P.2d 464, 474 (1954). See
also Comment, The Scope of the Initiative and Referendum in California, 54 CArin. L.
R v. 1717, 1731 (1966).
"H. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON TE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION O' THE LAWS 219
(2d. ed. 1911).
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constitutional convention. 5 Observing that the Rhode Island constitu-
tion authorized the general assembly to propose amendments, the
court concluded: 66
[T]he mode provided in the Constitution for the amendment thereof is
the only mode in which it can be constitutionally amended. The ordinary
rule is that where power is given to do a thing in a particular way, there
the affirmative words, marking out the particular way, prohibit all other
ways by implication, so that the particular way is the only way in which
the power can be legally executed.
The losing parties had relied on principles of popular sovereignty.
They pointed to article I, section 1 of the Rhode Island constitution
which provided: "The basis of our political systems is the right of
the people to make and alter their constitutions of government; .
To this argument the court replied: 67
Finally, it has been contended that there is a great unwritten common
law of the states, which existed before the Constitution, and which the
Constitution was powerless to modify or abolish, under which the people
have the right, whenever invited by the General Assembly, and as some
maintain, without any invitation, to alter and amend their constitutions.
If there be any such law, for there is no record of it, or of any legislation
or custom in this State recognizing it, then it is, in our opinion, rather
a law, if law it can be called, of revolutionary than of constitutional
' 1n re The Constitutional Convention, 14 R.I. 649 (1883) overruled by In re Opinion
to the Governor, 55 R.I. 56, 178 A. 433 (1935). Reaction to the 1883 Rhode Island
opinion was varied though not as violent as in 1842. See note 16 supra. One of the
several pamphleteers active after the decision wrote:
Alas what a pity our fathers didn't mention
That we boys, if very good, could hold a convention.
They never said we shouldn't but didn't say we might,
"Ergo," cry the sages, "you haven't got the right."
'Twas very bad, indeed, their permission to deny,
But infinitely worse at once to up and die;
For thus they turned the lock and flung away the key,
And Rhode Island's "in a box" for all eternitee.Quoted in Z. Cm-E, THE CONs UTONAL CONVEN N T T NzvExR MET 5 (1938).
More serious criticism of the 1883 Rhode Island opinion is found at notes 89-95 infra
and accompanying text.
G In re The Constitutional Convention, 14 R.I. 649, 651 (1883) overruled by In re
Opinion to the Governor, 55 R.I. 56, 178 A. 433 (1935).
Jameson is quick to point out that this opinion was at most an advisory opinion "not
properly [a] judicial decision, binding upon either the officers propounding the questions
[to the court] which they purported to answer, or upon the judges themselves." JAWMsoN
at 606. See also JAxsoN, Appendix E, pp. 667-69.
'In re The Constitutional Convention, 14 R.I. at 654.
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change. Our Constitution is, as already stated, by its own terms, "the
supreme law of the State." We know of no law, except the Constitution
and laws of the United States, which is paramount to it.
One backer of the Rhode Island court noted the dangers of ap-
plying popular sovereignty doctrine to constitutional change. Quoting
from an 1883 Iowa decision, William Sheffield observed that popular
desire for extraconstitutional change could be peacefully satisfied only
when the people unanimously agreed on the change. If on the other
hand, he continued, there are many who object to the change, there
would be civil war.68 He concluded: "It follows then after all, that
the much boasted right [of popular sovereignty] . . . is simply the
right to alter the government in the manner prescribed in the existing
constitution or the right of revolution ... 2,69
sW. SHEFFIELD, THE MODE OF ALTERING TEE CONSTITUTION OF RHODE ISLAND 20-21
(1887) quoting from Koehler v. Hill, 60 Iowa 543, 14 N.W. 738 (1883).
W. SHEFFIELD, THE MODE OF ALTERING THE CoNsnTuTiON OF RHODE ISLAND 21
(1887). Sheffield argued vehemently that the only manner in which a constitution could
be revised was by that manner directed in the constitution. He drove home his argument
with a quotation from Koehler v. Hill, 60 Iowa 543, 14 N.W. 738 (1883):
If, therefore, a constitutional provision is to be enforced at all, it must be treated
as mandatory, and if the legislature habitually disregard it, it seems to us that there
is all the more urgent necessity that the courts should enforce it, and it also seems
to us that there are few evils which can be inflicted by a strict adherence to the
law, so great as that which is done by the habitual disregard by any department of
the government of a plain requirement of that instrument from which it derives its
authority, and which ought, therefore, to be scrupulously observed and obeyed ....
We deem it sufficient to say that if there is any provision of the Constitution which
ought to be regarded as mandatory, it is the provision for its own amendment ....
Id. at 23.
But Sheffield failed to distinguish the Koehler case from the Rhode Island matter. In
Koehler, the Iowa Supreme Court struck down a liquor prohibition amendment to the
Iowa constitution on the ground that the procedure used to enact the amendment had
varied from the constitutionally prescribed mode. The Iowa constitution required that
proposed constitutional amendments be transcribed on the journals of both houses of the
general assembly. Id. at 738. Since there were discrepancies in the language of the amend-
ment as it had been entered on the house and senate journals, the court held it void.
Though Koehler is an extreme case, it is fairly consistent with a long line of authorities
to the effect that if one is going to amend a constitution by the constitutionally prescribed
mode then there must be exact adherence to that mode. See authorities collected in DODD
at 216-17.
The Rhode Island case, however, involved a completely different question. There, the
attempt to call a constitutional convention was not an act pursuant to the constitution-
ally prescribed method; rather, it was an act in derogation of the constitutionally pre-
scribed mode. Since the Rhode Island constitution was silent on the matter of calling
a convention there was no provision to which adherence was necessary.
It should also be noted that Sheffield's quotation was a mix of the court's language
with a quotation by the court from T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CoNsTIVToNA.
LfmrTATIoNs, sutpra note 18.
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Finally, the Rhode Island court rejected the contention that the
expressio unius maxim should be applicable only in the interpretation
of statutes and deeds and not applicable in the interpretation of
constitutions. The court noted:70
Those who assert this difference do not appear to have any reason to give
for it but this, namely: that under stress of strong political excitement, the
rule, if it exists, is pretty sure to be disregarded, as past experience proves,
and therefore it is better to conclude that it does not exist.
Citing Opinion of the Justices,7' the court decided that the maxim was
a guide to language and would be just as applicable to interpretation
of constitutional language as to statute or will language. 2
The Rhode Island opinion seems to build a persuasive case for ap-
plication of the expressio unius maxim in similar situations. Yet there
is no record that the maxim has been employed since 1883 to block
an extraconstitutional convention. This is not to say that the logic of
the maxim has lost its appeal; occasionally, a jurist or commentator
will argue for use of the maxim when proponents of reform seek to
employ revision methods not expressly mentioned in the existing
constitution.7 3 The idea still has sufficient validity to have been in-
cluded in a modern legal reference volume which states: "Any at-
tempt to revise a constitution or adopt a new one in any manner other
'In re The Constitutional Convention, 14 R.I. at 652 (1883).
60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 573 (1833). This Massachusetts decision was written in 1833.
However, due to an oversight, it was not included in the reports until 1883.
'The Rhode Island court concluded: "Men do not put away their spontaneous and
habitual modes of expressing themselves merely because they are engaged in the unac-
customed work of framing or adopting a constitution." 14 RI. at 652. W. Snarnm
supra note 68, agrees at 16-17.
Opinion of the Justices, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 573 (1833), and the Rhode Island court's
reliance on this Massachusetts decision are discussed at notes 89-91 infra and accompany-
ing text.
'See, e.g., Gatewood v. Matthews, 403 S.W.2d 716, 72i-23 (Ky. 1966) (dissent):
The authors of our Constitution outlined in section 258 definite and specific steps
for its revision. This is the one and only mode of revision contained therein. Had the
authors intended any other mode of revision, they would have said so. Had they
intended its revision in "any manner as they (the people) may deem proper," as is
urged by appellees, section 258 would have been an indulgence in idle curiosity
and speculation. I believe there is no reasonable-minded person in this Common-
wealth who doubts that it was the intention of the authors of the Constitution to
provide an exclusive plan for revision.
It appears to me that the only justification for the majority opinion is expediency
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than that provided in the existing instrument is almost invariably
treated as extraconstitutional and revolutionary."74
D. Rejection of Limitations on Popular Sovereignty
Historical precedent and sound reasoning have led to a rejection
of the restrictive requirements of the traditional legitimacy theory
and the expressio unius maxim.
1. Historical Rejection
Hoar, in assessing reform experiences up to 1917, concludes that
the right of the people to call a constitutional convention cannot be
restricted by explicit provisions in an existing constitution."5 Hoar
then details historical evidence in five states that confirms his observa-
tion.71
In Delaware, for instance, the constitution of 1831 provided that
a constitutional convention could be called only when the people
voted on the third Tuesday of May in any year and only when the
total of affirmative votes was a "majority of all the citizens of the
state having a right to vote for representatives. 7 7 In 1851, the
Delaware General Assembly decided to poll the electorate to deter-
mine the need for a constitutional convention. Of those voting on the
convention question, a majority favored a convention, but the number
was not sufficient to constitute a majority of all those electors who
could vote for representatives. Despite this significant discrepancy,
" 16 Am. JuR. 2d Constitutional Law § 26 (1964). It should be noted that none of the
cases cited there are exactly in point. Most of the cited cases, such as Moore v. Brown,
350 Mo. 256, 165 S.W.2d 657 (1942), are those in which the courts have struck down
proposed amendments because their enactment procedures varied in some manner from
the constitutional provisions relating to amendment. For example, in Moore, one of the
reasons the Missouri Supreme Court voided the initiative measure proposing a constitu-
tional amendment was that the initiative did not disclose some related constitutional
provisions it would affect. This omission was held a violation of statutes passed by the
legislature upon a constitutional mandate.
Thus, the cases cited by the editors are not cases like In re The Constitutional Con-
vention, 14 R.I. 649, 651 (1883), where the expressio unius maxim was used to prohibit
an extraconstitutional convention. There is a very important distinction between cases
like Moore, supra, and Koehler, 60 Iowa 543, 14 N.W. 738 (1883), where revision was
attempted in a manner prescribed by the constitution, and cases like In re The Constitu-
tional Convention, supra, and the present Washington situation, where revision is at-
tempted in a manner which the constitution does not mention at all.
HoAR at 50.
Id. at 51-52.
T7id. at 51.
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the General Assembly certified that the people had called a conven-
tion and enacted another law actually convening the convention. Hoar
noted:78
If the constitution of Delaware could effectively limit the right of the
people to call a convention, then this convention was illegal and void. If,
on the other hand, the people can lawfully disregard the constitution
even in cases where the constitution provides for a convention, then this
convention was valid. The question arose in the convention itself, and
the majority opinion of the delegates was that the clause of the constitu-
tion was merely recommendatory, not peremptory.
Other examples prove the same point. The Indiana constitution of
1816 provided for the convening of a convention every twelfth year.
Yet the Indiana Constitutional Convention of 1850 was held within
one of the twelve-year periods and its legitimacy was never doubted.7 9
Of this convention, Hoar wrote: "It would seem... that it is even a
stronger disregard of the constitution to hold a convention whenever
you please, under a constitution which says you may hold it in 1828,
1840, or 1852, than to hold a convention whenever you please, under
a constitution which makes no mention of conventions .... .
The Pennsylvania constitution of 1776 contained a provision pre-
scribing the only method of amendment allowed. Under the early
Pennsylvania scheme a Council of Censors had the authority to con-
vene a constitutional convention when they felt the need was evident.
Twice proponents of reform attempted to persuade a majority of the
Censors to call a convention. Neither attempt was successful. Just
before the Council was to meet again, the Pennsylvania General As-
sembly acted unilaterally. It instructed its members to return to their
districts and test the mood of the people. The members of the as-
sembly found that the electorate favored a convention, returned to
the capitol, and enacted a law convening a convention. The convention
of 1789 wrote and established the Pennsylvania constitution of 1790.81
In Georgia, the constitution of 1777 authorized a convention upon
petition of a majority of the electorate. The state legislature ignored
"'Id., dting JAwnsoEN at 209, n.1.
7Id., dting JAmmolN at 210, n.1. See also Ellingham v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336, 99 N.E. 1,
9-10 (1912).
O HoA at 41-42.LId. at 51-52, citing JAmwoN at 213-214.
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this explicit provision and appointed a convention in 1788. This con-
vention drafted a new constitution which was modified by a second
convention the delegates to which were elected by the people in the
1788 general election. The modified constitution was submitted to
yet a third convention comprised of delegates popularly elected in
1789.82
The 1838 constitution of Florida expressly provided that "no con-
vention of the people shall be called, unless by the concurrence of two-
thirds of each House of the General Assembly." Disregarding this
instruction, the governor called a convention by himself. The conven-
tion drafted the Florida constitution of 1865 and the action was
upheld by the Florida Supreme Court.83
It can be observed that the language of the Florida constitution is
similar to that of the present Washington constitution-the legislature
is to call the convention. The Florida language, phrased in the neg-
ative, is even stronger than the Washington language yet that provi-
sion did not preclude other reasonable means of calling a convention.
Hoar concludes:84
These five examples would seem to establish the principle that con-
ventions, even when expressly authorized by the constitution, are never-
theless popular in their nature, and have pretty much the same standing
as though the constitution had been silent on the subject. In other words,
constitutional provisions permitting the holding of conventions are, like
legislative acts on the subject, merely recommendatory to the people.
Thus we come back to the fact that all conventions are valid if called
by the people speaking through the electorate at a regular election. This
is true, regardless of whether the constitution attempts to prohibit or to
authorize them, or is merely silent on the subject. Their validity rests
2JAM oSN at 135-36; DoDD at 42.
HoAR at 52; Bradford v. Shine, 13 Fla. 393 (1871).8 HoAR at 52. Another example of disregard for the expressio unius maxim is found
in the history of constitutional revision in North Dakota. The North Dakota
constitution stipulated that the legislature could present the convention issue to the
electorate after passing a law and sending it to the governor for his approval or veto.
Since the legislature proposed to call an election on this issue by a concurrent resolution
that did not require the governor's signature, the secretary of state refused to certify the
issue for the November, 1896 election. Supporters of the convention sought and obtained
a writ of mandamus to compel submission. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded:
The decided weight of authority and the more numerous precedents are arrayed on
the side of the doctrine which supports the existence of this inherent legislative
power to call a constitutional convention, notwithstanding the fact that the instru-
ment itself points out how it may be amended.
State ex rel. Wineman v. Dahl, 6 N.D. 81, 68 N.W. 418, 420 (1896).
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not upon constitutional provision nor upon legislative act, but upon the
fundamental sovereignty of the people themselves.
2. Sound Reasoning Has Rejected Application of the Expressio Unius
Maxim to Restrict Constitutional Change
(a) Reversal of opinion by the Rhode Island Supreme Court. A
convenient starting point for an analysis of the rejection of the ex-
pressio unius maxim is to study the reversal of opinion by the Rhode
Island Supreme Court-the one court that in 1883 had directly ap-
plied the maxim to prohibit an extraconstitutional convention. In 1935
the Rhode Island court observed that their previous decision, In re
The Constitutional Convention,5 had been subject to vigorous attack
from the day it was rendered and, further, it had never been relied
upon by any other court which had considered the issue involved.8 6
Nothing that the prior opinion had been based solely on the expres-
sio unius maxim, the justices decided: "[W]e are convinced that the
judges [in the 1883 opinion] misunderstood the maxim and its proper
application.18 7 They concluded:
88
'In re The Constitutional Convention, 14 R.I. 649 (1883).
'In re Opinion to the Governor, 55 R.I. 56, 178 A. 433, 436 (1935) overruling In re
The Constitutional Convention, 14 R.I. 649 (1883).
One of the Rhode Island constitutional scholars that wrote critically of the 1883
decision was Judge Charles Smith Bradley, a Chief Justice of the Rhode Island Supreme
Court. In his book, Tam Mxitons OF CHANGING THm CONST'IUTIONS OF Tm STATES,
ESPECIALLY THAT OF RHODE ISLAND (1885), he observed that the Rhode Island Court
first spelled out the constitutional provision for amendment and then
the inference is drawn that "it is inconceivable to us that they would have elaborated
so guarded a mode of amendment, unless they had intended to have it exclusive and
controlling." This inference is met by the historic fact that such provisions have not
been so considered in about fifty State constitutions, which contain the same provi-
sion for amendment, and also provisions for a convention. The opinion and the
pamphlet [Bradley was writing in reply to Somm THouGHTs oN rHm CoNSOrruTiow
OF RHODE ISLAND (1884), by Chief Justice Thomas Durfee of the 1883 Rhode
Island Supreme Court] rest only upon an inference set up against the usage of the
country as to the meaning and effect of these provisions.
Id. at 56-57. Other authorities criticizing In re The Constitutional Convention, supra, are
JAmEsoN at 605; DODD at 45; and HoAR at 45-48.
'In re Opinion to the Governor, 55 R.I. 56, 178 A. 433, 440 (1935). The manner in
which the judges of the 1883 court misunderstood the expressio isnius maxim will be
discussed at notes 106-108 infra and accompanying text.
'In re Opinion to the Governor, 55 R.I. 56, 178 A. 433, 437-438 (1935). CHAFEE,
supra note 65 at 7, explained the political circumstances under which the 1935 opinion
was written.
Therefore, when the coup d'etat of January 1, 1935, placed all three branches of the
government in Democratic hands, [previously the Democratic Party had been
hampered by a malapportioned legislature which diluted the influence of their
stronghold in Providence and by the lack of a veto for the usually Democratic
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[I]t is our opinion after careful consideration that it is the duty of the
General Assembly to pass whatever laws may be needed, at any time or
from time to time, to enable the people by an explicit and authentic act
to make a new Constitution or to alter the present one.
The method of doing this, which had been recognized as the regular
and ordinary method and which had been used before 1843 by many
states, when there was no provision for it in their Constitutions, was
first, by the holding of a convention under a legislative enactment, second,
by the framing of a new Constitution or the revision of the existing one,
and, third, by the adoption of such new Constitution or revision by the
people at an election provided for by law.
One of the major reasons for over-ruling the 1883 Rhode Island
decision was the discovery that the Massachusetts decision, Opinion
of the Justices,9 upon which the opinion had relied, did not stand for
the proposition for which it had been cited. The Massachusetts deci-
sion did not say, as the 1883 Rhode Island court assumed, that a
convention was illegal because the constitution provided for amend-
ments. Rather, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Council said that
the amendment method prescribed by the Massachusetts constitution
was the only method for revision "under and pursuant to the existing
Constitution." In its decision, which was in answer to a legislative
request for a decision on the legality of a proposed convention, the
Massachusetts court expressly reserved the question of whether the
people could legally call a convention in a manner other than that
prescribed by the constitution. The justices observed that this re-
served matter"
would involve the general question of natural rights, and the inherent and
fundamental principles upon which civil society is founded, rather than
any question upon the nature, construction, or operation of the existing
constitution of the commonwealth, and the laws made under it. We pre-
governor] plans were disclosed at once for . . . a convention. The first step was to
get rid of the advisory opinion of 1883. This is commonly supposed to be one
reason why the five Republican judges of the Supreme Court were immediately
ousted, and a new court with a Democratic majority put in their place. Three
weeks later, Governor Green asked the new judges to give him a fresh advisory
opinion on the validity of a constitutional convention. In view of the numerous
conventions in other states with no express provisions in their constitutions, the
favorable opinion that was eventually given could reasonably be anticipated from the
start.
' 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 573 (1833). See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
I Opinion of the Justices, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 573, 574 (1833).
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sume, therefore, that the opinion requested applies to the existing constitu-
tion ....
While the court did say that a convention could not be called pursuant
to the existing constitution, they concluded that the people probably
did have the inherent power to call a convention 1
(b) The legislative authority has inherent power to propose
constitutional revision. The basis for the over-ruling of In re The
Constitutional Convention was the recognition that the legislative
power to propose a convention is an inherent power that cannot be
restricted by affirmative constitutional provisions 2 It should be un-
derstood that legislatures have predominantly inherent powers-au-
thority the legislatures possess without any grant from the state
constitutions. These powers are unlimited except where restrictions
are specifically imposed by the federal or state constitutions. Restric-
tions on legislative powers must be clear; 9 4 thus, an enumeration of
certain legislative powers does not operate to restrict exercise of other
powers not mentioned.9 5 Notwithstanding the fact that a legislature
may enact all reasonable laws not prohibited, constitutions often
specifically "grant" legislative powers to the legislature. For instance,
'Id. at 574-75. The relationship between Opinion of the Justices and In re The Con-
stitutional Convention is discussed in jAsoz' at 605; DODD at 45; HoAR at 45-47; and
in Lord, The Massachusetts Constitution and the Constitutional Conventions, 2 MASS.
L.Q. 1, 23-25 (1916).
1
2In re Opinion to the Governor, 55 R.I. 56, 178 A. 433, 438-39 (1935).
'As the Washington Supreme Court has stated:
We are mindful of the fundamental principle that the state constitution is not a
grant, but a restriction on the law-making power. The power of the legislature to
enact all reasonable laws is unrestrained except where, either expressly or by fair
inference, it is prohibited by the state or federal constitutions.
Pacific Am. Realty Trust v. Lonctot, 62 Wn. 2d 91, 95, 381 P.2d 123, 126 (1963). Accord,
State ex rel. O'Connell v. Myers, 51 Wn. 2d 454, 465, 319 P.2d 828, 832 (1957); Miller
v. Clarke, 47 R.I. 13, 129 A. 606, 608 (1925).
4 See, e.g., WAsH. CoxsT. art. II, §§ 24-29 which provide in part:
§ 24: The legislature shall never authorize any lottery or grant any divorce.
§ 25: The legislature shall never grant any extra compensation to any public officer
§ 28: The legislature is prohibited from enacting any private or special laws in the
following cases:-
1. For changing the names of persons, or constituting one person the
heir at law of another.
2. . .
It is important to note that there is no provision in the Washington constitution that
reads to the effect: "The initiative power shall not include the power to summon a con-
stitutional convention."
I State ex rel. O'Connell v. Meyers, 51 Wn. 2d 454, 465, 319 P.2d 828, 832 (1957).
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the Washington constitution provides that the legislature may initiate
the call for a constitutional convention."
There is an important and practical significance to this classification
of legislative powers as either inherent or granted. As to inherent
powers, the courts employ a liberal construction and resolve questions
of power to pass a particular law in favor of the legislature." But, as
to granted powers, the courts require that every substantial require-
ment of the grant be strictly observed and followed 8
Most legislatures have both inherent and granted powers to initiate
constitutional revision. In addition to receiving express grants of
authority to draft constitutional amendments for submission to the
electorate, legislatures frequently have been given the power to submit
the convention call issue to the people."9 And, in some cases, the
people have expressly reserved to themselves the legislative power to
initiate constitutional amendments.' 0 In all these cases, when the
' WASH. CONST. art. XXIII, § 2. While the legislature's authority to initiate a con-
vention is not dependent on this specific grant of legislative power (see note 102 infra
and accompanying text), the legislature's authority to exercise nonlegislative power is
dependent on specific constitutional grants. An example of granting the legislature a
non-legislative power is the provision in the Washington constitution giving the senate
the power to consent to or reject certain appointments of the governor. WASH. CoNsr.
art. XIII, § 1. See also ATT' GEN. DRAFT, supra note 10, at O'Connell, Use of the
Initiative to Call a Constitutional Convention, 6-7.
07 ATT'r GEN. DRaFT, supra note 10, at O'Connell, Use of the Initiative to Call a Con-
stitutional Convention, 7.
'See, e.g., Koehler v. Hill, 60 Iowa 543, 14 N.W. 738 (1883) and authorities collected
in DODD at 216-17.
An example of the narrow interpretations cast on granted powers is found in McFadden
v. Jordan, 32 Cal. 2d 330, 196 P.2d 787 (1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949). In
McFadden, the California Supreme Court held that authority under the California
constitution to propose constitutional amendments by initiative did not include the
power to propose general constitutional revision.
'See note 44 supr-a and accompanying text. See also DODD at 129-136; HoAR at 83-85.
As described earlier, this is the method of revision provided for in the Washington State
constitution at article XXIII § 1 (note 53 supra and accompanying text).
In DODD at 127-28, 136. Though the Washington constitution has no provision for
proposing amendments by popular initiative, the Attorney General has held that the
constitution can be amended in this manner. 1939-40 WASH. Op. AT'T'. G N. 238-41. In
view of this opinion it is possible that the people can use a two-step procedure for
calling a constitutional convention. First, by initiative, they could amend article II,
section 1 to allow calling a constitutional convention by initiative. Second, exercising
this newly granted power, they could initiate a convention. The two-step procedure is
supported by the argument that the people should be able to decide whether the elec-
torate as well as the legislature hold the right to initiate a convention. Those in favor
of the people's right would vote in favor of the first initiative-this is what occurred
in Massachusetts in November, 1968. However, some of those who favor the people's
right to call a convention might feel that there is no need for a convention at this time
and would then vote against the second initiative.
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legislatures or the people exercise their granted powers, they must
exercise them in strict conformity with the grant.
As to inherent powers, the law is quite clear that the legislatures
do not have the inherent power to make or remake a constitution
directly or even indirectly by submitting a legislative draft of a new
constitution to the electorate." 1 But the law is equally well settled
that the legislatures do have the inherent power to provide by law
for the convening of a constitutional convention. 2 As Daniel Webster
once explained: 0 3
Another American principle growing out of this, and just as important
and well settled as is the truth that the people are the source of power,
is that, when in the course of events it becomes necessary to ascertain
the will of the people on a new exigency, or a new state of things or of
opinion, the legislative power provides for that ascertainment by an
ordinary act of legislation.
We see . . . from the commencement of the government under which
we live... one uniform current of law, of precedent, and of practice, all
going to establish the point that changes in government are to be brought
about by the will of the people, assembled under such legislative provi-
sions as may be necessary to ascertain that will, truly and authentically.
(c) Affirmative provisions for constitutional reform cannot limit
inherent power to propose a convention. Can a constitution's affirma-
tive provisions for constitutional revision limit the legislature's in-
herent power to call a convention? Since inherent powers to call a
convention are broadly construed, 04 this is unlikely. Further, inherent
It is entirely conceivable that this whole approach is only an academic consideration.
The Washington Supreme Court has not spoken even on the narrow issue of whether
the people can amend the constitution by initiative and the Attorney General's Opinion,
referred to above, is suspect since it did not distinguish between granted and inherent
powers.
2JajAoims at 422-23; HoAR at 79 ff. Ellingham v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336, 99 N.E. 1
(1912): The Indiana General Assembly, at its regular biennial session held in 1911,
drafted a proposed new constitution. Following the governor's approval, the new con-
stitution was to be submitted to the people. Before the election could be held the Board
of Elections was enjoined from submitting the constitution issue. The Supreme Court
affirmed.
'OCoomy, A TRxATisE o1i T= CoNsTrUoTAL LnmrTAIoNs, supra note 18, at 56;
JAmmSoN at 210-12; DODD at 44; and HoAR at 24-25, 40.
a
0
'VI D. WE snRm, WoRxs OF DAmrn WaasTE 227-29 (5th ed. 18S3).
=DSee note 97 supra and accompanying text.
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legislative authority is restricted by "limitations," not by affirmative
provisions. As the Washington court stated: "In the absence of spe-
cific words of limitation, an express enumeration of legislative powers
does not exclude the exercise of others not named."' 0 5 The legislature
already has the inherent power to call a convention and provisions
in an existing constitution on the same subject do not restrict that
inherent power.
Application of the expressio unius maxim so that affirmative provi-
sions limit inherent legislative power stems from a misunderstanding
of the maxim.10 6 The maxim does not mean that where two powers
are consistent, the granting or affirmative provision for one power
is a prohibition of the exercise of the other.""' The proper basis of
the rule is that affirmative words may be construed as operating
negatively also (to exclude similar unexpressed powers), if such a
construction is necessary to give the affirmative words meaning.' If
the method specified in the express provision could never be used
because of the exercise of another, unexpressed method, there would
be justification for application of the maxim to exclude the latter.
Following this reasoning, use of an initiative petition to call a constitu-
tional convention should not be prohibited by express constitutional
provision for a legislative convocation of a convention. The express
provisions would continue to have great meaning-as when the ini-
tiative proponents fail to secure the requisite number of valid signa-
tures to place the issue on the ballot.
Finally, a good argument can be made that the expressio unius
maxim should not be used under any circumstances to interpret con-
stitutional language.0 9 Some authorities feel that the maxim is log-
ically unsound."0° Others argue that this mechanistic rule of
construction might be applied to interpret statute or deed language
' State ex rel. O'Connell v. Meyers, 51 Wn. 2d 454, 465, 319 P.2d 828, 832 (1957).
"See generally, H. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTITUTION AND INTERPRETATION OF
THE LAWS 219-23 (2d ed. 1911).
... n re Opinion to the Governor, 55 R.I. 56, 178 A. 433, 441 (1935).
'11Id. See also JAMESON at 606-08 and COOLEY, A TR TISE ON T=E CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS, supra note 18, at 105.
"In re Opinion to the Governor, 55 R.I. 56, 178 A. 433, 440 (1935). See also Eastern
Archipelago Co. v. Queen, 2 Ellis and Blackburn R. 856, 879, 118 Eng. Rep. 988, 996
(Q.B. 1853); Barto v. Himrod, 8 N.Y. 483, 493, 59 Am. Dec. 506, 511; and Williams v.
Mayor of Detroit, 2 Mich. 560, 564 (1853) (Cited in JAiESON at 608-609).
'Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HAzv. L. Rav. 863, 873-74 (1930).
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but that such a risk should not be taken with fundamental, constitu-
tional language."' A maxim of construction may provide a "short-cut"
to the solution of an interpretation problem but "short-cuts" should
not be sought when constitutional language is involved.
(d) Expressio unius should not be applied to restrict popular sov-
ereignty. Thus far many arguments have been advanced for rejecting
the use of the expressio unius maxim to restrict the convening of a
constitutional convention. The basic assumption of each argument is
that this maxim of construction-expressio unius-must not be used
to limit popular sovereignty. Accordingly, one court has stated that
specific provisions for revision should not be viewed as "exclusive?'
since "the recognized rule is that if two constructions of a constitu-
tional provision are reasonably possible, one which would diminish or
restrict a fundamental right of the people and the other of which
would not do so, the latter must be adopted." 2 s
Such a liberal construction of revision provisions is essential since,
as Hoar observed,"x3
The people have the right to change their form of government at will,
using whatever method suits them.
This is a fundamental right, which constitutions are powerless to deny,
restrict, or limit as to method.
3. The Proper View of Express Constitutional Provisions for Revi-
sion
If expression of one method of revision cannot limit inherent legis-
lative power to call a convention in another manner, and if it cannot
prohibit the electorate from convening a convention in any authentic
way, then for what purpose is the expression in the constitution in the
first place? According to the authorities, the proper view of expressed
constitutional revision provisions is that, at most, they only provide
"'See note 109 supra.
"2it re Opinion to the Governor, 55 R.I. 56, 178 A. 433, 441-42 (1935).
n3Ho~A at 221. Language in a recent Kentucky opinion is explicit:
The right of each generation to choose for itself is inalienable .... Being thus
inalienable, that right cannot be cut down or subjected to conditions any more than
it could be completely denied by one generation to another. So long as the people
have due and proper notice and opportunity to acquaint themselves with any
revision, and make their choice directly by a free and popular election, their will is
supreme, and it is to be done.
Gateway v. Matthews, 403 S.W.2d 716, 721 (Ky. 1966).
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a means for the expression of an inherent popular right." 4 Of these
provisions, Hoar stated: "That the constitution is merely helping out
a superior right, rather than granting a privilege to the people, is
shown by the fact that the people may accept so much of the constitu-
tional assistance as they wish, and may disregard the constitutional
limitations.""' Under the express constitutional provisions, the gov-
ernment's ordinary legislative power is merely used to assist or facil-
itate the exercise of the people's right to convene a convention.
Where ordinary legislative power is used to assist the electorate in
calling a constitutional convention, provisions in the existing constitu-
tion are never deemed exclusive." 0 As the Rhode Island justices
stated in In re Opinion to the Governor, the specific power "granted"
to the General Assembly in article 13 of the Rhode Island constitution
(the power to propose amendments for popular ratification) should
"naturally and reasonably be viewed as an additional rather than an
exclusive power .... ,,17 Actions by the existing government which
assist the people to convene a convention are not limited by express
constitutional provisions since they are actions in exercise of the
people's reserved powers of sovereignty."' The assistance the govern-
ment provides, e.g., supplying the machinery to establish the conven-
tion, is not action in exercise of powers delegated by the constitution.
As the Maryland Supreme Court put it recently:" 9
To use the Legislature, a body created by the constitution, to provide the
mechanics and sinews for changing that constitution by ascertaining the
will of the people, for the election of delegates and the submission of
their work to the people and at the same time to class their legislative
actions as not encompassed by the provisions of the constitution as to
laws may at first thought seem so illogical as to be unsound. Yet it has
been accepted generally as sound and proper.... This technique is but
part of the exercise of the fundamental right of the people to change
114 Bradley supra note 86, at 92. See also UHL, STOUDEaarsE & SHERRILL, supra note 35
at 3.
"'HoAR at 50-51.
"' ATr'v. GEN. BRIEF, supra note 10, at 13 (with cases cited).
1' In re Opinion to the Governor, 55 R.I. 56, 178 A. 433, 441-42 (1935).
gSATrly. GEN. BRIEF, supra note 10 at 13:
The principle of non-limitation operates in these circumstances because, by assisting
the people in the exercise of their rights, legislation "borrows" authority from the
inherent, retained rights of the people which are above and beyond the existing
constitution.
"Board of Supervisors v. Attorney Gen., 246 Md. 417, 229 A,2d 388, 396-97 (1967).
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their constitution whenever and however they deem fit; this right derives
not from constitutions, but is a retained inherent right above and beyond
the constitution, and therefore actions of the Legislature making avail-
able and supporting the exercise of that right ... are actions in exercise
of the people's reserved powers of sovereignty and not actions in exercise
of powers delegated by the Constitution.
4. Recent Decisions Approving Extraconstitutional Conventions
Three recent decisions approving extraconstitutional conventions
indicate a reliance on the tenets of popular sovereignty and a con-
tinued rejection of the traditional notion of legitimacy and the ex-
pressio unius doctrine.120 The first decision was in Kentucky in 1966
where the court upheld the validity of a new constitution submitted
to the voters in a manner different from the procedure which was
provided by the existing constitution. The stage was set by the 1964
Kentucky General Assembly which enacted legislation establishing
the Constitutional Revision Assembly. The Revision Assembly drafted
a revised constitution and submitted the document to the General
Assembly. The 1966 General Assembly passed a law submitting the
revised constitution to the voters. The draft was to be adopted or
rejected by the voters at the November 8, 1966, general election but
the revision issue was immediately brought before a Kentucky Circuit
Court.
Plaintiff, a taxpayer, sought declaratory relief and an injunction
prohibiting the state officers from placing the question of adoption of
the new constitution on the ballot. Plaintiff alleged that the actions of
the 1964 and 1966 General Assemblies proposing a new constitution
were invalid since they failed to conform with section 258 of the
Kentucky constitution which provides that a constitutional convention
can be proposed for a vote of the electorate after two-thirds of both
houses of the legislature, for two consecutive sessions, agree that such
a convention is necessary.121 The circuit court refused to issue an
I Gatewood v. Matthews, 403 S.W.2d 716 (Ky. 1966); Board of Supervisors v. Attor-
ney Gen., 246 Md. 417, 229 A.2d 388 (1967); Stander v. Kelley, 433 Pa. 406, 250 A.2d
474 (1969).
' KY. Co Nsr. § 258 reads in part:
[Wihen a majority of all the members elected to each House of the General Assembly
shall concur ... in enacting a law to take the sense of the people of the State as to
the necessity and expediency of calling a Convention for the purpose of revising or
amending this Constitution, and such amendments as may have been made to the
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injunction. In affirming the decision, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
isolated as the primary question: "whether by the terms of Sections
256 [providing for legislative initiation of constitutional amendments]
and 258 of the Constitution the people have imposed upon themselves
exclusive modes of amending or of revising their Constitution.' 122
Observing that the actions of the General Assembly had not followed
the dictates of section 258 of the 1891 constitution, the court declared
that the authority for the legislative action 123
must be derived from the sovereign power of the people as delineated in
section 4 of the [Kentucky] Bill of Rights [which reads:]
All power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded
on their authority and instituted for their peace, safety, happiness and
the protection of property. For the advancement of these ends, they have
at all times an inalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform or abol-
ish their government in such manner as they may deem proper.
The court found it "inconceivable" that provisions of the 1891
constitution might divest the people of their inherent power to reform
the constitution. "The power of the people to change the constitution"
said the court, "is plenary, and the existence of one mode for exer-
cising that power does not preclude all others."' 24 Emphasizing the
right of each generation to choose for itself, the court concluded that
no constitution can declare an exclusive mode of revision. 125
One year after the Kentucky decision, the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals confronted the same issue when the Maryland General Assembly
called a constitutional convention in a manner different from that
same, such law shall be spread upon their respective journals. If the next General
Assembly shall, in like manner, concur in such law, it shall provide for ...holding
general elections at the next ensuing regular election to be held for State officers or
members of the House of Representatives, which does not occur within ninety days
from the final passage of such law, at which time and places the votes of the
qualified voters shall be taken for and against calling the Convention, in the same
manner provided by law for taking votes in other State elections . . . If it shall
appear that a majority voting on the proposition was for calling a Convention, and
if the total number of votes cast for the calling of the Convention is equal to one-
fourth of the number of qualified voters who voted at the last preceding general
election in this State, the Secretary of State shall certify the same to the General
Assembly at its next regular session, at which session a law shall be enacted calling
a Convention to readopt, revise or amend this Constitution, and such amendments
as may have been made thereto.
-Gatewood v. Matthews, 403 S.W.2d 716, 718 (Ky. 1966).
L"Id. at 718.
"'Id. at 719.
'- Id.
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provided in the constitution of 1867.120 The Maryland constitution
provided that the General Assembly should take "the sense of the
People" at specified intervals to determine the need to convene a con-
vention. The General Assembly was to enact legislation convening a
convention if a majority of those voting at the election favored it.127
Though the next specified date of consulting the electorate on the
need for a convention was the 1970 general election, the 1966 Mary-
land General Assembly passed a law to poll the voters on this issue at
a special election to be held in conjunction with the 1966 primary
election. The law also provided that if a majority of those voting at
the special election voted for a convention, it should assemble on
September 12, 1967. At the September 13, 1966, special election, the
majority of those voting on the convention issue voted to call a con-
vention (the margin was almost five to one), but the number of votes
cast in the special election (both for and against the constitution) was
not a majority of the total votes cast in the primary election held the
same day.
Because of the constitutional question raised by these discrepancies,
the 1967 General Assembly authorized the Attorney General to seek
declaratory relief. Among the nine questions directed to the circuit
court was question (h): "In light of the fact that those voting 'for'
the calling of a convention did not constitute a majority of those
voting in the [primary] election, is the calling of a convention at this
time mandatory?' 28 The circuit court held that the deviations from
the constitutional provision did not invalidate the election. The Mary-
land Court of Appeals affirmed, citing the constitution: "That all
Government of right originates from the People, is founded in com-
'Board of Supervisors v. Attorney Gen., 246 Md. 417, 229 A.2d 388 (1967).
1' MD. CONST. art. XIV, § 2 (amended 1956) reads in part:
It shall be the duty of the General Assembly to provide by Law for taking, at the
general election to be held in the year nineteen hundred and seventy, and every
twenty years thereafter, the sense of the People in regard to calling a Convention
for altering this Constitution; and if a majority of voters at such election or elections
shall vote for a Convention, the General Assembly, at its next session, shall provide
by Law for the assembling of such convention, and for the election of Delegates
thereto.... But any Constitution, or change, or amendment of the existing Consti-
tution, which may be adopted by such Convention, shall be submitted to the voters
of this State, and shall have no effect unless the same shall have been adopted by a
majority of the voters voting thereon. (The 1956 amendment, inter alaa, advanced
the next specified interval from 1887 to 1970.)
'Board of Supervisors v. Attorney Gen., 246 Md. 417, 229 A.2d 388, 391 (1967).
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pact only, and instituted solely for the good of the whole; and they
have at all times, the inalienable right to alter, reform or abolish
their form of Government in such manner as they may deem ex-
pedient."12 The court recited previous instances of deviation from
constitutional provisions allegedly controlling constitutional revision
and concluded that express revision provisions were more often ig-
nored than followed. 1 30
Specifically, the court held that the special election was not held
pursuant to the existing constitution and that, as a consequence, the
provisions of the constitution requiring a majority vote of all those
in the election did not apply to invalidate the special election. Thus,
the high court determined that the 1967 Constitutional Convention
was legally constituted; the express provisions of the Maryland con-
stitution had not precluded resort to other, more expedient, approaches
to reform.
In February, 1969, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the
people of that state could amend their existing constitution by conven-
tion despite the absence of any provision for a convention in their
constitution. Further, the court held that procedures that led to the
enactment of the amendments by the electorate did not violate the
amendatory provisions of the existing constitution because the amend-
ments were not initiated pursuant to those provisions but were instead
initiated in another lawful manner-by convention. 3 '
In March, 1967, the Pennsylvania General Assembly had authorized
a limited constitutional convention to propose amendments to the
constitution of 1874. This proposal to call a convention was approved
by the electors in May, 1967. The convention met and proposed
several amendments for submission to the electorate. Because the
method in which the amendments were proposed varied in substantial
fashion from the method provided in the existing constitution, the
plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Secretary of the Commonwealth from
submitting the proposals to the voters. The relief sought was denied
in the lower court, and in April, 1968, the eligible voters of the state
adopted several of the proposed constitutional amendments.
' MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. 1 as quoted in Board of Supervisors v.
Attorney Gen., 246 Md. 417, 229 A.2d 388, 400 (1967).
'1o Id., 229 A.2d at 397-400.
' Stander v. Kelley, 433 Pa. 406, 250 A.2d 474 (1969).
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On appeal (after the election), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
heard the following facts and arguments. Article XI of the Pennsyl-
vania constitution specified that amendments to the constitution could
be proposed to the electorate following a majority approval of the
amendments by both houses of two successive General Assemblies."8 2
Three months had to intervene between the time the second Assembly
proposed the amendments and the election at which they would be
voted upon.133 There was no provision for a constitutional convention.
Plaintiffs contended that the convention method of proposing the
1968 amendments was unconstitutional since article XI was silent as
to that method. Further, plaintiffs contended that the 1968 procedure
violated article XI since only eighteen days intervened between the
time the convention proposed the amendments and the time the election
on those amendments was held. The Supreme Court rejected both
contentions'34 observing first that the Pennsylvania constitution of
1874 had been proposed by a convention when the existing constitu-
tion at that time specified another method of revision, and second,
that the adoption of the United States Constitution directly con-
travened article XIII of the Articles of Confederation. The court
concluded as to this latter issue: "We reaffirm our prior decisions
which have consistently held that so long as a Constitutional Conven-
tion is not expressly prohibited by the then existing Constitution, it
represents a proper manner and method in which the citizens of Penn-
sylvania may initiate an amendment of their Constitution."' 35
I Article XI was formerly Article XVIII. The renumbering was accomplished by a
Governor's proclamation. Id., 250 A.2d at 478 n.6.
PA. CONST. art. XI, § 1 reads in part:
Amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in the Senate or House of
Representatives; and if the same shall be agreed to by a majority of the members
elected to each House, ... the Secretary of the Commonwealth shall cause the same
to be published three months before the next general election, in at least two news-
papers in every county . . . ; and if, in the General Assembly next afterwards
chosen, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be agreed to by a majority
of the members elected to each House, the Secretary of the Commonwealth shall
cause the same again to be published... ; and such proposed amendment or amend-
ments shall be submitted to the qualified electors of the State . .. at least three
months after being so agreed to by the two Houses, as the General Assembly shall
prescribe; and, if such amendment or amendments shall be approved by a majority
of those voting thereon, such amendment or amendments shall become a part of the
Constitution; but no amendment or amendments shall be submitted oftener than once
in five years. ...
The Supreme Court decision in this case came after the new amendments had been
approved by the electorate. Stander v. Kelley, 433 Pa. 406, 250 A.2d 474 (1969).
= Id., 250 A.2d at 479.
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Rejecting the notice contention, the court said:186
It is undoubtedly true that in matters relating to the alteration or amend-
ment or change or abolition of the Constitution . . . all the clear and
mandated provisions of the Constitution must be strictly followed and
obeyed . . . . However, the appellants misconstrue what has taken place
here. These new amendments to or revision of the Constitution were not
adopted pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution of
1874, but were adopted pursuant to and through a different manner of
amendment-the Constitutional Convention. As we said earlier, this Court
has declared that the convention method of amending the Constitution
is lawful.
The Pennsylvania decision is a persuasive addition to the near-
unanimous body of opinion rejecting the proposition that express
constitutional provisions for particular methods of revision exclude
other methods not mentioned. Scholarly judicial reasoning has made it
clear that the legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius cannot
be relied upon to prohibit or limit the inherent right of the legislature
to propose or the people to call conventions to revise their state con-
stitutions. Under current analysis, the popular sovereignty doctrine
legitimizes constitutional conventions convened by any authentic act
of the electorate. Thus, the authorities suggest that article XXIII,
section 2 of the Washington constitution [providing that the legislature
shall call a convention] does not preclude calling a convention by
initiative.
III. USE OF THE WASHINGTON POPULAR INITIATIVE TO
CONVENE A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
Having established that any authentic expression of popular sover-
eignty may provide the vehicle for convening a constitutional conven-
tion, the next question to be asked is: Does the popular initiative
approach qualify as an authentic expression? Analysis leads to the
conclusion that the initiative mechanism may be used to call a constitu-
tional convention.
Use of an initiative to put the convention issue on the ballot may be
either the exercise of a granted legislative power or the exercise of an
1 2Id.
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inherent legislative power. As Hoar wrote: "If the [convention en-
abling] act originates by an initiative petition, it is clear that the peo-
ple pass the act, although there may be some dispute as to whether
they proceed under the authority of the constitution, or under a supra-
constitutional authority, with the mere assistance of the constitu-
tion. 2217
A. Use of the Initiative as a Granted Legislative Power
Use of an initiative to place the convention issue before the elec-
torate may be the exercise of a granted legislative power. Article
XXIII, section 2 of the Washington State constitution provides that
the legislature shall submit to the voters the question of convening a
constitutional convention. Analysis of Washington cases indicates that
the people, through the popular initiative, may exercise all granted
legislative powers.138 Presumably this would include the exercise of
the article XXIII power to place the convention issue before the
voters.
In State ex rel. Mullen v. Howell89 there was a dispute over
whether a joint resolution of the legislature was subject to referendum.
In January, 1919, the Washington Legislature ratified, by joint resolu-
tion, the prohibition amendment to the federal constitution. The fol-
lowing March, Mullen tendered a referendum petition to the respon-
dent Secretary of State seeking to have the action of the Legislature
reversed. The Secretary of State refused to file or number the petition
on the grounds that the amendment had been ratified by a joint
resolution-not by an act, bill, or law-and was not within the terms
of the seventh amendment which reads:' 4°
The legislative authority of the State of Washington shall be vested in
the legislature, consisting of a senate and house of representatives, which
shall be called the legislature of the State of Washington, but the people
reserve to themselves the power to propose bills, laws, and to enact or
reject the same at the polls, independent of the legislature, and also
7HotA at 77.
"'State ex rel. Mullen v. Howell, 107 Wash. 167, 181 P. 920 (1919); State ex rel.
Miller v. Hinkle, 156 Wash. 289, 286 P. 839 (1930); State ex rel. O'Connell v. Kramer,
73 Wn. 2d 85, 436 P.2d 786 (1968).
S107 Wash. 167, 181 P. 920 (1919).
"' WAsH. CoNsT. art. II, § 1.
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reserve power, at their own option, to approve or reject at the polls any
act, item, section or part of any bill, act or law passed by the legislature
(emphasis added).
Mullen sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of State to
receive the petition. The Supreme Court ordered the writ to issue. 1 4'
At issue was the scope of the initiative and referendum power. The
determination of whether a "joint resolution" was a "bill, act or law"
turned on the question of "whether the people intended an act, bill,
or law to be statutes enacted by the legislature, or whether they meant
action by the Legislature which affected them as law?' 142 (Emphasis
added). The court chose the second-and broader-alternative, con-
cluding that the terms of the seventh amendment "imply in the
strongest possible way that the intention of the people was to reserve
a right to review every act of the legislature which might affect the
people in their civil rights or limit or extend their political liberties
143
In State ex rel. Miller v. Hinkle"' the Washington court considered
the scope of the initiative power. At issue was whether the seventh
amendment initiative provision could be utilized to reapportion the
legislature. The court stated that "the matter of apportioning the state
for legislative membership is a matter of law, requiring legislative
acts."' 45 The court reasoned that the constitution itself required this
interpretation since two sections of article II (containing the reap-
portionment section) began with the phrase "until otherwise provided
by law." Citing Mullen v. Howell, the court declared that the seventh
amendment had revested the legislative power in the people and held
that the initiative could be the legislative act necessary to redistrict
the legislature.
Finally, the Miller court stated that the initiative was as broad as
x"State ex tel. Mullen v. Howell, 107 Wash. 167, 181 P. 920 (1919). Note that in this
case the court dealt with the merits while in State ex tel. O'Connell v. Kramer, 73 Wn. 2d
85, 436 P.2d 786 (1968), a case involving use of an initiative to convene a constitutional
convention, the court refused to discuss the merits. The latter case is still useful since
the court stated (in dictum) that an initiative petition proposing a convention was like
any other legislative act. 73 Wn. 2d at 85, 436 P.2d at 787.
"4 State ex tel. Mullen v. Howell, 107 Wash. 167, 170, 181 P. 920, 922 (1919).
'Id. at 168, 181 P. at 921.
'" State ex tel. Miller v. Hinkle, 156 Wash. 289, 286 P. 839 (1930).
'Id. at 292, 286 P. at 840.
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the referendum.146 Since, after Miller, the initiative and referendum
powers are equal in scope, the statements in Mullen speaking to the
referendum may also be applied to the initiative.
A combined analysis of the Mullen and Miller cases leads one to
the conclusion that legislative acts which affect the people in their civil
rights or limit or extend their political liberties are subject to the
initiative power. Convening a constitutional convention meets both
criteria. First, article XXIII, section 2 of the state constitution states
that the legislature shall "recommend" to the voters that they vote
for or against a convention, and, if the voters approve the convention
call, then the legislature shall "provide by law" for the convocation.147
Clearly, legislative acts are required to convene a convention. Second,
it is obvious that convening a constitutional convention may affect
the people in their civil rights, or may limit or extend their political
liberties. An argument that article XXIII is not within the scope of
the initiative because the legislature only "recommends" a convention
(without passing a bill, act or law) would fall before the reasoning of
the Mullen court.148
Following the reasoning of the two previous cases, it appears that
the people, through the initiative, may exercise the article XXIII
power to convene a constitutional convention. This conclusion raises
another question: Would the people's exercise of the granted legisla-
tive power be subject to the limitations included in the grant? The
framers of the constitution, who expressly authorized the legislature to
convene a constitutional convention, imposed two restrictions on the
exercise of that power. First, two-thirds of the members of each house
of the legislature had to agree that a convention was necessary; and
I" Miller, supra note 144, cites State ex rel. Howell v. Superior Court, 97 Wash. 569,
166 P. 1126 (1917) for the proposition that the initiative is as broad as the referendum.
There is no explicit statement to that effect in Howell. Rather, the case speaks of the
initiative and referendum interchangeably.
11 WAsw. CoNsT. art. XXIII, § 2 is set out in note 3 supra and in the text accompany-
ing note 53 supra.
" There does not seem to be a requirement that the legislative act affect the people
immediately. In Mullen, supra note 142, the approval of the prohibition amendment (to
the federal constitution) by the Washington Legislature did not have the effect of im-
mediately dosing the saloons. Rather, additional, and independent, ratifications were
necessary. Likewise, there is no certainty that the legislative act "recommending" a con-
vention will have an immediate affect. Indeed, if the electorate does not approve the
convention or later rejects a convention product, then the legislative act will have had
no affect on the people's civil rights or political liberties.
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second, for the convention call to be approved by the electorate there
had to be a favorable majority of all those voting in the general elec-
tion at which the convention vote was scheduled.'49 It is difficult to
envision how the first restriction could be applied to an exercise of the
initiative power. An initiative petition must contain valid signatures
equal to eight percent of the number of voters voting in the preceding
gubernatorial election.' Conceivably, the two-thirds requirement of
article XXIII, section 2 might require a great number of initiative
petition signatures, but who would set the increased number and what
would the higher figure be?
The second restriction could be applied to the initiative with less
difficulty. Approval of an initiative requires only a majority of the
votes cast upon the issue (rather than a majority of all votes cast in
the election) provided that the total votes cast on the initiative issue
equals one-third of the total votes cast in the election. 5' If the people,
through the initiative, exercise the article XXIII granted power, it
may be that the terms of article XXIII would require approval of
the convention call by a majority of the voters in the election. It is
not clear whether or not such a requirement would contravene the
one-man, one-vote dictate of the federal Constitution. 5 It can be said,
however, that the general rule is as follows: limitations on the process
of constitutional amendment by the legislature will not be applied to
the process of amendment by initiative.'53 Whether this general rule
"' WAS1H. CONST. art. XXIII, § 2 is set out in note 3 supra and in the text accompany-
ing note 53 supra.
'° WASH. CONST. art. II, § I(A) is set out near the end of note 8 supra.
' WAS3r. CONST. art. II, § 1 (d) is also set out in note 8 supra.
'If the opponents of a convention merely refrained from voting on the convention
issue when the majority of those voting in the election rule is in effect, they could
effectively dilute the importance of votes favorable to the convention. This could con-
stitute a violation of the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Cf. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) ;
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S.
713 (1964); Lance v. Roane City Ed. of Educ., - W. Va. -, 170 S.E.2d 783 (1969).
1 Grant v. Hardage, 106 Ark. 506, 153 S.W. 826 (1913). In this case there was a
conflict between the procedure for constitutional amendments submitted by the legisla-
ture and the procedure prescribed for constitutional amendments proposed by initiative.
Amendments proposed by the legislature had to be published six months before the next
general election while initiative measures had to be filed four months before the election
at which they were to be voted upon. Id. The court held that the original constitutional
requirements for legislative amendments had to yield to the new requirements for initia-
tive amendments. The decision was based on the fact that the initiative requirements had
been added to the constitution subsequent to the legislative amendment requirements. Id.
at 827.
Reasoning by analogy, it might be argued that the validation terms of the Washington
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will extend to calling a convention by initiative is unknown. 154
B. Use of the Initiative as an Inherent Legislative Power
The potential problems that could arise if article XXIII granted
legislative power is exercised by initiative would not arise if the
people, through an initiative, assert their popular sovereignty and
exercise their inherent legislative power to call a convention. As noted
above, convening a constitutional convention is an inherent power of
the legislative authority5 and the possessors of that inherent power
may exercise it notwithstanding existing constitutional provisions for
revision. In acting independently of the existing convention proposal
provisions, those who exercise inherent powers also act independently
of the restrictions there expressly imposed. 56 If the people convene
a convention by initiative, the only applicable restrictions would be
those included in the initiative provision.
Basic to this analysis is the assumption that the voters, through the
initiative, may exercise all inherent legislative power. The Washington
state constitution supports this assumption. The seventh amendment
reads, in part: "[T]he people reserve to themselves the power to
propose bills, laws, and to enact or reject the same at the polls, inde-
pendent of the legislature. . . ." This reserved power is so complete
and absolute that the governor's normal legislative veto does not apply
to it.5 7
The assumption that the people may exercise all inherent legislative
power is also supported by the court's construction of the seventh
amendment. In State v. Paul,' the Washington Supreme Court em-
phasized the broad scope of the initiative power in these words: 159
Now the passage of an initiative measure as a law, by the people, is not
the exercise of the power of any different sovereignty than is the passage
initiative provision would control over the conflicting terms of the original constitutional
provision providing for a legislative call of a convention. Thus, validation of an initiative
convention call would require only a majority of the votes cast on that issue instead
of a majority of all the votes cast in the election. Such a result is indicated since the
Washington initiative clause was added at a date subsequent to passage of the original
constitution. Cf. Brickhouse v. Hill, 167 Ark. 513, 268 S.W. 865 (1925).
' These issues have never been broached by any court. See note 7 supra.
See notes 102 & 103 supra and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Stander v. Kelley, 433 Pa. 406, 250 A.2d 474, 479 (1969).
'WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(d), note 8 supra.
' State v. Paul, 87 Wash. 83, 151 P. 114 (1915).
31Id. at 90, 151 P. at 116.
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of a law by the legislature. Each is simply the exercise of the legislative
power of the state. Nor is the power superior in one as compared with
the other, with the exception that there are certain restrictions against
repeal by the legislature of an act passed by the people, within a limited
time.
Similarly, courts in other states have said that the legislature, and
the people exercising the initiative power, are coordinate legislative
bodies.160 The Washington court has said more than merely that the
initiative power is unlimited. In Love v. King County, the court ruled
explicitly that the people may exercise inherent legislative powers by
initiative.' 6' Love was an action by a taxpayer seeking to enjoin a
county from issuing general negotiable bonds. The petitioners alleged
that the issuance of the bonds violated a recently enacted initiative
measure limiting the rate of taxation. 62 The county argued that the
initiative measure limiting the rate was unconstitutional and had no
effect since the power of taxation was an inherent legislative power
that could not be limited or restricted by the people. The court dis-
agreed. Emphasizing that the power to tax is an inherent legislative
function, the court stated that an initiative "is as much a legislative
act as" is a statute.63 Pointing to article I, section 1 of the constitu-
tion, 64 the court reasoned:' 65
Under our form of government, ultimate sovereignty, so far as the state
is concerned, rests in its people, and so long as the government established
by them exists, that sovereignty remains with them, except so far as they
have expressly surrendered it to a higher authority.
" See, e.g., State ex rel. Public Serv. Comm'n. v. Brannon, 86 Mont. 200, 283 P. 202,
208 (1929), where the court stated: "A law may be enacted by the people exercising
the initiative or by the people acting through the Legislature. In either case the power to
enact a law is illimitable, except as restrained by the Constitution." Accord, Luker v.
Curtis, 64 Idaho 703, 136 P.2d 978, 979 (1943); State ex rel. Richards v. Whisman, 36
S.D. 260, 154 N.W. 707, 709-10, error dismissed 241 U.S. 643 (1915).
" Love v. King County, 181 Wash. 462, 44 P.2d 175 (1935).
1 The county resolution authorizing the issuance of the bonds also provided that "for
the punctual payment of the bonds, principal and interest, there should be levied ... a
direct tax without restriction or limitation as to the rate or amount thereof." Id. at 464-
65, 44 P.2d at 176.
"Id. at 469, 44 P.2d at 178.
18 WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 1 reads:
All political power is inherent in the people, and governments derive their just powers
from the consent of the governed, and the established to protect and maintain
individual rights.
'Love v. King County, 181 Wash. 462, 467, 44 P.2d 175, 177 (1935).
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The court concluded that the people, through the initiative, could
exercise the inherent power to limit the amount or rate of taxation
just as they had reserved the power to levy taxes in the first place.'66
Since another inherent legislative power is the authority to call a
constitutional convention, 6 7 it seems logical that the people may
exercise that power as well through the initiative mechanism.
C. Construction of Provisions for Initiatives
Since the Washington court in Paul, Mullen, and Love, along with
other courts,'6 has interpreted the people's reserved legislative power
in the broadest possible terms, it is not surprising that the courts have
required a liberal construction of the initiative provisions. For the
same reason, the courts have held that the initiative power will not be
restricted by implied limitations and must be harmonized, when pos-
sible, with existing constitutional provisions. Both of these positions
are incumbent upon the courts since the exercise of the initiative power
is the exercise of popular sovereignty.
In requiring a liberal construction, the Washington State Supreme
Court in State ex rel. Case v. Superior Court'69 cited the initiative
provisions of the Washington constitution which conclude: "This
section is self-executing, but legislation may be enacted especially to
facilitate its operation."' 70 The court then observed: 17'
Thus there is strongly suggested, in the language of the constitution and
this law, a required liberal construction, to the end that this constitutional
right of the people may be facilitated, and not hampered by either tech-
nical statutory provisions or technical construction thereof, further than
is necessary to fairly guard against fraud and mistake in the exercise by
the people of this constitutional right.
This language has been repeated by the Washington court' 2 and
paraphrased by the courts of other jurisdictions,' 73 and would seem to
'Id. at 467-69, 44 P.2d at 177.
See notes 102 & 103 supra and accompanying text.
's See note 160 supra.
State ex rel. Case v. Superior Court, 81 Wash. 623, 143 P. 461 (1914).
1WAsH. CoNsT. art. II, § 1(d).
171 State ex rel. Case v. Superior Court, 81 Wash. 623, 632, 143 Pac. 461, 464 (1914).
2"2Rousso v. Meyers, 64 Wn. 2d 53, 60, 390 P.2d 557, 561 (1964).
'"See, e.g., McFadden v. Jordan, 32 Cal. 2d 330, 196 P.2d 787 (1948), cert. denied, 336
U.S. 918 (1949).
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offer persuasive argument against an application of the expressio
unius maxim to limit the people's initiative power.
When prohibitions on implied limitations and requirements for
harmonious construction of the initiative power are added to the re-
quirement of a liberal construction, the barrier to application of the
expressio unius maxim appears impenetrable. In addition, these rules
would seem to mitigate against application of granted power restric-
tions to the initiative power. As to implied limitations, it has been held
that, while powers subject to the initiative may be limited, such a
limitation will not be implied unless the language of the provision
establishing the power clearly states that the power cannot be exer-
cised by initiative. 17'4 It can be recalled that article XXIII (providing
for legislative initiation of constitutional revision) is cast in "per-
missive" terms." 5 There is no language that compels an interpretation
that other methods are prohibited. Finally, the courts, in construing
an initiative or referendum amendment, have applied the following
rule of construction: "[T]he amendment and the previous provisions
of the [c] onstitution are to be harmonized, when not necessarily in-
consistent and repugnant. '' 76 As discussed above,1 77 the legislature's
article XXIII authority to convene a convention can be easily har-
monized with the people's right to call a convention by initiative. The
initiative method does not eliminate, or even complicate, exercise of
the article XXIII authority. Rather, use of an initiative to call a
convention will only be necessary when the legislature refuses to ex-
ercise its inherent or granted power.
To this point we have seen that the people's reserved legislative
authority is equal to that possessed by the legislature, that the con-
vening of a constitutional convention is an inherent legislative func-
tion, and that either the legislature, or the people through the initia-
tive, may exercise inherent legislative power. It is thus logical to
'7' Glass v. Smith, 150 Tex. 632, 244 S.W.2d 645 (1951) involving a municipal initiative.
'7" See note 3 supra.
'7'State ex rel. City of Little Rock v. Donaghey, 106 Ark. 56, 152 S.W. 746, 748
(1912). See also Brickhouse v. Hill, 167 Ark. 513, 268 S.W. 865, 874 (1925) (concurring
opinion) and Galvin v. Board of Supervisors of Contra Costa Cty., 195 Cal. 686, 235 P.
450, 452 (1925).
"
7 See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
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conclude that the people can call a constitutional convention through
use of the popular initiative. The authorities agree. Dodd wrote:""8
The introduction of the initiative and referendum in South Dakota,
Oregon, Montana, Oklahoma, Missouri, and Maine makes it possible for
the people of these states to initiate and adopt a measure providing that
a convention be held, and thus removes this question to a large extent
from legislative control.
Dodd approved of the initiative method of convening a convention
and suggested that the technique be extended to additional jurisdic-
tions.' Hoar, writing in 1917, observed: 8 0
Since the introduction of the initiative and referendum in the West and
Middle West, not only may constitutional amendments be made in twelve
States by an initiative petition without the interposition of either the
legislature or a convention; but also in six additional States, the people
can initiate and adopt a measure providing for the holding of a convention;
and may, by referendum, veto any statutes by which the legislature at-
tempts to interfere with a convention. In all these States . . . the con-
stitutions provide that legislative acts for calling of a convention must be
referred to the people . . . . Thus, in these States the convention is en-
tirely, absolutely, and unquestionably within the control of the people, and
hence owes nothing of its authority to the legislature.
A more recent student of constitutional reform, Albert Sturm, has
also concluded that the initiative is available to call a convention.
Sturm suggests that "the initiative may... be used to advantage in
overcoming legislative recalcitrance.' 1 '1
'DODD at 54. Washington was not included on Dodd's list since at the time he was
writing (1910) Washington had not yet adopted the initiative.
2"Id. at 292:
Popular control over the proposal of amendments should be extended. Legislatures
are not always responsive to the desires of the people in this respect, and it should
be possible to initiate proposed amendments by popular petition. The popular initia-
tive has already been introduced in several states, and its extension with respect to
constitutional questions is desirable. The popular initiative is open to many objections,
both theoretical and practical, but the people should have power independently of the
legislature, to force changes in their constitutions when such changes are desired.
HoAR at 58. In a footnote Hoar included Washington as one of the states in which
the initiative could be used to convene a convention. Id. at 58 n.2. Cf. Note, State Con-
stitutional Change: The Constitutional Convention, 54 VA. L. RaV. 995, 1002, 1006(1968).
mA. SuRm, M=arons o STATa Co0sTrnoNsA RaY0R 84 n.2, 120 (1954).
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CONCLUSION
Despite the encouraging opinions of the few scholars who have
considered the question, the initiative has never been used as a vehicle
for convening a state constitutional convention. This is not to say
that the idea of using an initiative for this purpose has not been con-
sidered. As will be recalled, 182 the Georgia constitution of 1777 pro-
vided for a convention convening device which looked very much like
a modern initiative provision. Article 63 of the 1777 Georgia constitu-
tion provided for a constitutional convention to be called by the
legislature "upon the petition of a majority of the voters of a majority
of the counties."'8 3 This tool was never used and, as Dodd suggests,
the method was "extremely cumbersome, and would probably have
proven unworkable had it been tried." ' 4 The greatest difficulty no
doubt was that the signature requirement was practically unattainable.
In another instance, supporters of reform in Massachusetts unsuc-
cessfully attempted to convene a constitutional convention by initiative
in 1923. However, the issue never reached a court since the backers of
the initiative failed to secure sufficient valid signatures to place the
initiative on the ballot.' It seems certain, though, that the issue will
be decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Council in mid-
1970.188
As the need for modernization of state government becomes more
acute there are likely to be more attempts to employ the initiative to
call constitutional conventions. Thus, courts will have to rule on the
"See notes 50 & 51 supra and accompanying text.
"' DODD at 42.
's'Id.
"' The 1923 Massachusetts convention initiative was criticized in Grinnell, Does the I.
and R. Amendment Authorize An "Initiative" Petition for Another Constitutional Con-
vention?, 9 MAss. L.Q. 34 (1924), reprinted 45 MAss. L.Q. 10 (1960). Grinnell argued
that the Massachusetts initiative power was not available for such a use since the consti-
tution provided that the initiative power could not be exercised in certain areas. Since a
convention would discuss all matters including those specifically excluded from the scope
of the Massachusetts initiative, Grinnell concluded that a petition to call a convention
would violate the express terms of the initiative power and would be unconstitutional.
Grinnell's argument was refuted in Goulding, The Use of the Popular Initiative Petition
for a Constitutional Convention Act, 47 MAss. L.Q. 367 (1962). Goulding concluded that
the initiative could be used to call a convention. The issues raised by the Grinnell article
as well as the basic issues discussed in this comment are now before the Supreme Judicial
Council of Massachusetts. This litigation arose following the successful 1968 initiative
campaign proposing to submit the convention call issue to the voters in 1970. See note
7 supra.
'See notes 7 & 185 supra. For a discussion of the Massachusetts decision see Editor's
Note on page 591.
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questions of (1) whether revision provisions in an existing constitu-
tion.preclude the use of other revision techniques, and (2) whether
a particular initiative provision is broad enough to encompass con-
vening a convention. If the Washington court is faced with these
issues, its own precedents187 would most likely lead it to conclude that
the scope of the seventh amendment of the Washington constitution
would include the authority for an initiative call of a constitutional
convention. Apparently, the initiative power is unlimited and may be
employed to exercise both granted 8 s and inherent legislative power. 8 9
Convening a convention probably falls into both of these categories. 90
The Washington court has little precedent to rely upon in deciding
the question whether the provision for legislative initiation of a con-
vention found in article XXIII of the Washington constitution pre-
cludes use of the initiative alternative. However, what the court has
said is instructive:' 9'
[I]t is a familiar rule that the state constitution is a limitation upon,
rather than a grant of, legislative power; that the legislature may enact
any law not expressly or inferentially prohibited by the constitution of
the state. ... In the absence of specific words of limitation, an express
enumeration of legislative powers does not exclude the exercise of others
not named.
Equally important is a long line of consistent decisions which have
held that express provisions for constitutional revision are no barrier
to other unexpressed methods for achieving the same goal. 192 Most
recently, popular sovereignty theory was emphasized by the Kentucky
Court of Appeals in 1966,11 by the Maryland Court of Appeals in
1967,11 and by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1969191 as these
'mSee, e.g., Love v. King County, 181 Wash. 462, 44 P.2d 175 (1935); State ex ref.
Miller v. Hinkle, 156 Wash. 289, 286 P. 839 (1930); State ex rel. Mullen v. Howell, 107
Wash. 167, 181 P. 920 (1919) ; Case v. Superior Court, 81 Wash. 623, 143 P. 461 (1914);
and, State v. Paul, 87 Wash. 83, 151 P. 114 (1915).
'State ex rel. Mullen v. Howell, 107 Wash. 167, 181 P. 920 (1919) ; and, State ex rel.
Miller v. Hinkle, 156 Wash. 289, 286 P. 839 (1930).
Love v. King County, 181 Wash. 462, 44 P.2d 175 (1935).
See notes 44, 102 & 103 spra and accompanying text.
m State ex rel. O'Connell v. Meyers, 51 Wn. 2d 454,465, 319 P.2d 828, 832 (1957).
'E.g., Bradford v. Shine, 13 Fla. 393 (1871); Woods Appeal, 75 Pa. 59 (1874); Wme-
man v. Dahl, 6 N.D. 81, 68 N.W. 418 (1896); Eflingham v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336, 99 N.E. 1
(1912) ; Stander v. Kelley, 433 Pa. 406, 250 A.2d 474 (1969).
Gatewood v. Matthews, 403 S.W.2d 716 (Ky. 1966).
'Board of Supervisors v. Attorney Gen., 246 Md. 417, 229 A.2d 388 (1967).
" Stander v. Kelley, 433 Pa. 406, 250 A.2d 474 (1969).
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courts approved extraconstitutional conventions. Only one court has
ever blocked extraconstitutional reform and that court later reversed
itself.' 96
John W. Hempelmann*
APPENDIX
INITIATIVE MEASURE 241**
CALLING 1970 STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
BE IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE
STATE OF WASHINGTON:
SECTION 1. PREAMBLE. The present constitution of the state of Wash-
ington was adopted in 1889. Since that time it has been amended on a piece-
meal basis a total of forty-eight times. It has never been comprehensively
revised. In its present form the constitution is archaic, making it difficult for
local and state governments to respond to the problems of modern society.
Although a number of other states have recently acted to rewrite their
constitutions, the Washington state legislature has not exercised its authority
to initiate a call for a constitutional convention to prepare a draft of a
modern state constitution for submission to the voters. Therefore, the people
of the state of Washington, in exercise of their reserved law-making and
political powers, do hereby call for a state constitutional convention to be
held in the manner hereinafter set forth.
SEC. 2. CALL FOR CONVENTION. There shall be a state constitutional
convention, hereinafter referred to as the 1970 State Constitutional Conven-
tion, which will convene in December, 1969, and hold general sessions in
1970, for the purpose of preparing a revised state constitution for approval
or rejection by the people at the November 3, 1970, general election.
SEC. 3. ELECTION OF DELEGATES. A state general election shall be
held on Tuesday, November 4, 1969, for the purpose of electing delegates to
'In re The Constitutional Convention, 14 R.I. 649 (1883) overruled In re Opinion
to the Governor, 55 R.I. 56, 178 A. 433 (1935).
* Member, Washington State Bar Ass'n. B.A. Georgetown University, 1964. J.D. Uni-
versity of Washington, 1969.
This paper is based upon a similar paper submitted by the author to Georgetown
University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Master of Arts degree in
Political Science.
** Not submitted to the people, due to the inability of the sponsors to obtain sufficient
signatures. See note 6 supra.
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the 1970 State Constitutional Convention. At this election there shall be
elected ninety-nine delegates to the convention on the basis of two delegates
from each of the senatorial districts established by chapter 6, Laws of 1965,
together with a third delegate from the forty-second senatorial district as
thereby established. The election of delegates shall be by position within the
respective senatorial districts, there being two positions, designated "A" and
"B" within each senatorial district and a third, designated "C," within
the forty-second senatorial district. Any registered voter of the state of
Washington and of the particular district shall be eligible for election as a
delegate.
SEC. 4. DECLARATIONS OF CANDIDACY. All candidates for election
to the office of delegate to the 1970 State Constitutional Convention herein
provided for shall file their declarations of candidacy by not earlier than
Monday, July 28, 1969, nor later than Friday, August 1, 1969, using the
form prescribed by RCW 29.18.030. Declarations of candidacy shall be filed
with the secretary of state in the case of candidates from districts comprising
more than one county, and with the county auditor of the particular county
in cases of candidates from districts wholly contained in a single county. A
filing fee of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) shall be paid by each candidate at
the time of filing his declaration of candidacy.
SEC. 5. NONPARTISAN PRIMARY AND GENERAL ELECTION.
The election of delegates to the 1970 State Constitutional Convention shall
be on a nonpartisan basis. Upon filing his declaration of candidacy, each
candidate shall indicate the alphabetically designated position within his
district to which he seeks election. Candidates shall be nominated at a
primary election in accordance with RCW 29.13.070, and the names of the
person who receives the greatest number of votes and of the person who
receives the next greatest number of votes for each position at the primary
shall appear on the general election balot under the designation therefor. The
candidate for each position receiving the greatest number of votes at the
general election shall be deemed elected, and shall be a delegate to the 1970
State Constitutional Convention.
SEC. 6. CONVENTION POWERS AND APPROPRIATION. It shall be
the duty of the 1970 State Constitutional Convention to prepare a revised
constitution of the state of Washington for submission to the people as here-
inafter provided at the general election of November 3, 1970. In performance
of this duty the convention shall have power to purchase necessary supplies
and materials, to employ such legal, technical and clerical employees as it
deems necessary, and to fix the compensation of such employees, all within
the limits of an appropriation of $975,000 from the state general fund which
is hereby made for the purpose of funding all authorized costs and expenses
of the convention during the 1969-71 biennium. In addition, the convention
shall have plenary power to do all things necessary to accomplish its purpose
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as herein set forth and shall be entitled to call upon and receive without
charge the professional or other services of any state officer and employee.
The convention may make such use of the chambers and offices of the House
of Representatives as it deems necessary, unless the convention sessions are
in conflict with a special legislative session, in which case the legislature shall
make provision for other suitable facilities for use of the State Constitutional
Convention. Any vacancies occurring in the membership of the convention
shall be filled by designation of a replacement having the same qualifications
as the vacating member, in such manner as the convention by rule shall
provide.
SEC. 7. CONVENTION TIMETABLE. The constitutional convention of
delegates elected in accordance with Sec. 5 hereof shall convene in the state
capitol on Friday, December 19, 1969, for purposes of organization, planning,
employment of staff and assignment of such research or other projects as it
deems appropriate to have accomplished prior to undertaking the formal
work of the convention. At this organizational session the lieutenant governor
shall serve as temporary chairman until a permanent chairman is selected by
the convention, and Robert's Rules of Order (latest published edition) shall
be in effect until the convention adopts its own rules. The convention shall
then adjourn and reconvene on Monday, February 16, 1970, and shall remain
in session for such period as is necessary to complete the work assigned by
Sec. 6 hereof: PROVIDED, That the convention shall file a complete copy
of its proposed revised constitution with the secretary of state not later than
June 19, 1970, and shall then adjourn.
SEC. 8. COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES OF DELEGATES. Dele-
gates to the 1970 State Constitutional Convention shall receive compensation
at the rate of twenty-five dollars per day for each day they are in attendance
at the State Constitutional Convention and, in addition, they shall receive
per diem, in lieu of actual expenses for subsistence and lodging, at the rate
of twenty-five dollars per day for each such day, and reimbursement for
travel expenses at the rate of ten cents per mile for travel in going to and
coming from the convention sessions or for travel on other convention busi-
ness authorized pursuant to rules adopted by the convention.
SEC. 9. PUBLICATION AND NOTICE REQUIREMENTS. The 1970
State Constitutional Convention shall file a complete copy of the revised
constitution with the secretary of state by not later than June 19, 1970, as
hereinbefore provided. Thereupon, the secretary of state shall publicize the
revised constitution in the manner specified by the convention; in the absence
of such direction, the secretary of state shall cause the full text of the revised
constitution to be published once during the month of September, 1970, in at
least one daily legal newspaper in each county of the state: PROVIDED,
That in counties wherein no daily newspaper is published, publication as
herein provided shall be made in at least one weekly legal newspaper pub-
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lished therein. In addition, the secretary of state shall cause the complete
text of the proposed reviewed constitution to be set forth in the official voters'
pamphlet to be issued in 1970, pursuant to chapter 29.81 RCW. All costs of
publication herein provided for shall constitute allowable charges against the
appropriation made by Sec. 6 of this act.
SEC. 10. SUBMISSION TO PEOPLE. The revised constitution which is
prepared by the 1970 State Constitutional Convention shall be submitted to
the people at the general election of November 3, 1970. The convention shall
be responsible for the preparation of ballot propositions which will enable the
people to vote on the question of whether the revised state constitution shall
be adopted in whole or in part. The secretary of state shall cause such
propositions to be placed on the November 3, 1970, general election ballot
throughout the state, and is hereby authorized and directed to do all things
necessary to cause this to be done. An affirmative vote by a majority of the
voters voting on any proposition shall constitute adoption of the proposition.
EsrroR's NoTE: The pending Massachusetts cases mentioned in Footnotes 7, 185 and
186 were decided on June 5, 1970, shortly before the printing of this volume. In Cohen
v. Att'y Gen. and Cohen v. Sec. of the Commonwealth Nos. 14,403 and 14,404, (Mass.,
June 5, 1970) the Supreme Judicial Council, the highest court of Massachusetts, ruled
that the Massachusetts legislative initiative could not be used to exercise the legislative
prerogative to place the issue of a constitutional convention before the electorate. [See
Footnote 7, supra for a description of how the issue arose.]
Article 48 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 provides, in
part: "[Tlhe popular initiative . . . is the power of a specified number of voters to
submit constitutional amendments and laws to the people for approval or rejection."
MAss. Co~sT. amends., art. 48. The Supreme Judicial Council felt that the basic and
determinative issue of the two cases was "whether the proposed measure [the initiative
to place the convention call issue before the electorate] falls within the meaning of the
words 'law' or 'laws' as they are used in the initiative provisions of art. 48."
In answering the question in the negative the Council relied almost exclusively on
the legislative history preceding adoption of the constitutional amendment providing
for the initiative. The Council reviewed the background and proceedings of the Massa-
chusetts Constitutional Convention of 1917-1918 and concluded "to the delegates to
that convention the use of the initiative petition as a device to call a constitutional
convention was unthinkable." The Council felt that because delegates to the 1917-18
Convention approved of the initiative proposal of constitutional amendments such
initiative amendments were the only manner in which the initiative power could affect
the constitution. Accordingly, initiatives proposing laws could not involve constitutional
revision even though one might term the means through which the legislature normally
places the convention call issue before the people, a "law."
Convention proceedings cited in Cohen v. Att'y Gen. do not support the Council's
broad statement that use of the legislative initiative to convene a convention was "un-
thinkable" to the delegates. It is clear that the delegates had not considered this possi-
bility at all and therefore it would have been impossible that this use of the legislative
initiative could have been excluded.
The Washington legislative initiative would not lend itself to the same sort of analysis
the Massachusetts court applied to the Massachusetts initiative. The Washington ini-
tiative does not specifically provide for amendments to the constitution by initiative.
Further, the Washington Supreme Court has made clear that the initiative power of the
people should not be hampered by technical construction. See Comment, Part M be-
ginning at page 576 supra.
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It should also be noted that three of the seven justices participating in Cohen v.
Att'y Gen. felt that but for the 1918 debates the language of the Massachusetts initiative
was broad enough to permit initiative adoption of a "law" authorizing a vote on the
convention call question. See Cohen v. Att'y Gen., No. 14,403 (Mass., June 5, 1970)
(Cutter, concurring).
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